Exploiting Inherent Program Redundancy for Fault Tolerance by Li, Xuanhua
ABSTRACT
Title of dissertation: Exploiting Inherent Program Redundancy
for Fault Tolerance
Xuanhua Li, Doctor of Philosophy, 2009
Dissertation directed by: Professor Donald Yeung
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
Technology scaling has led to growing concerns about reliability in micro-
processors. Currently, fault tolerance studies rely on creating explicitly redundant
execution for fault detection or recovery, which usually involves expensive cost on
performance, power, or hardware, etc. In our study, we find exploiting program’s
inherent redundancy can better trade off between reliability, performance, and hard-
ware cost.
This work proposes two approaches to enhance program reliability. The first
approach investigates the additional fault resilience at the application level. We
explore program correctness definition that views correctness from the application’s
standpoint rather than the architecture’s standpoint. Under application-level cor-
rectness, multiple numerical outputs can be deemed as correct as long as they are
acceptable to users. Thus faults that cause program to produce such outputs can
also be tolerated. We find programs which produce inexact and/or approximate
outputs can be very resilient at the application level. We call such programs soft
computations, and find that they are common in multimedia workloads, as well as
artificial intelligence (AI) workloads. Programs that only compute exact numerical
outputs offer less error resilience at the application level. However, all programs that
we have studied exhibit some enhanced fault resilience at the application level, in-
cluding those that are traditionally considered as exact computations–e.g., SPECInt
CPU2000.
We conduct fault injection experiments and evaluate the additional fault tol-
erance at the application level compared to the traditional architectural level. We
also exploit the relaxed requirements for numerical integrity of application-level cor-
rectness to reduce checkpoint cost: our lightweight recovery mechanism checkpoints
a minimal set of program state including program counter, architectural register file,
and stack; our soft-checkpointing technique identifies computations that are resilient
to errors and excludes their output state from checkpoint. Both techniques incur
much smaller runtime overhead than traditional checkpointing, but can successfully
recover either all or a major part of program crashes in soft computations.
The second approach we take studies value predictability for reducing fault
rate. Value prediction is considered as additional execution, and its results are com-
pared with corresponding computational outputs. Any mismatch between them is
accounted as symptom of potential faults and incurs restoration process. To reduce
misprediction rate caused by limitations of predictor itself, we characterize fault
vulnerability at the instruction level and only apply value prediction to instructions
that are highly susceptible to faults. We also vary threshold of confidence estima-
tion according to instruction’s vulnerability–instructions with high vulnerability are
assigned with low confidence threshold, while instructions with low vulnerability
are assigned with high confidence threshold. Our experimental results show benefit
from such selective prediction and adaptive confidence threshold on balance between
reliability and performance.




Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the
University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulfillment













For my lovely baby Kelly.
ii
Acknowledgments
I sincerely express my gratitude to all the people who have made this thesis
possible. Because of their kindness and love, my graduate experience has been one
that I will cherish forever.
First of all, I really thank my advisor, Dr. Donald Yeung. He has not only
patiently advised my research throughout my long stay in the graduate program,
but also impressed me for life with his own integrity, intelligence, passion to work,
etc. I always enjoyed the time discussing problems with him. And his help and
advices have helped me to overcome numerous difficulties.
I also thank my dear husband, Huanfeng, and my family in China. I always
thank God for bringing Huanfeng to my life. He is such a wonderful husband, a good
friend and listener. I know no matter what happens, he is always there supporting
me. I also thank my own family–my dad and mom, my brother and sister-in-law,
and my little niece. Although they are far away from me, their consistent love and
caring have supported me throughout the past years. I especially thank my brother,
Menghua, for all he has done and is doing for our family.
I always feel lucky to be one of the members in Systems and Computer Archi-
tecture Lab (SCAL). I thank my colleagues for their help and discussion: Seungryul,
Dongkeun, Hameed, Wanli, Meng-ju, Inseok, Xu, Aamer, Brinda, Rania, Kursad,
Sumesh, Ohm, Zahran, and all other lab-mates. I also appreciate the members of
my PhD defense committee: Dr. Gang Qu, Dr. Manoj Franklin, Dr. Bruce Jacob,
and Dr. Amr Baz. I would like to acknowledge other graduate students and staffs at
iii
Maryland: Bo, Juanjuan, and Vivian. I also express my special thanks to friends I
knew during my internships: Dr. Steve Crago, Janice McMahon, Paul, Saila, Hima,
and many others. I apologize to those I have inadvertently left out.
In addition, I thank my baby who is coming to this world soon. I am so excited
and looking forward to embracing her.
Lastly, I sincerely thank God for his endless love and care.
iv
Table of Contents
List of Figures vii
List of Abbreviations xi
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1.1 Application-level Fault Tolerance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1.2 Value Prediction-based Fault Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3 Road Map . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2 Background 12
2.1 Hardware Faults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2 Fault Tolerance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2.1 Fault Susceptibility Characterization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2.2 Fault Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2.3 Fault Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.2.4 Partial Fault Detection/Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3 Application-level Fault Susceptibility 19
3.1 Application-Level Correctness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.1.1 Qualitative Program Outputs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.1.2 Correctness Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.2 Fault Susceptibility Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.2.1 Experimental Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.2.2 Fault Susceptibility Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.3 Sources of Fault Tolerance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4 Fault Recovery by Exploiting Application-level Correctness 37
4.1 Lightweight Fault Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.1.1 Lightweight Recovery Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.1.2 Lightweight Recovery Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.2 Soft Checkpoint Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.2.1 Soft Program State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.2.2 Soft Recovery Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
4.3 Soft Recovery Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.3.1 Soft Checkpoint Cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.3.2 Soft Recovery Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
5 Fault Detection with Value Prediction 55
5.1 Reducing Error Rate with Value Prediction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
5.1.1 Value Predictor Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
5.1.2 Predictor-Based Fault Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
v
5.1.3 Fault Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
5.1.4 Analysis of Instruction Vulnerability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
5.2 Experimental Methodology and Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
5.2.1 Simulator and Benchmarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
5.2.2 Value Prediction Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
5.2.3 Confidence Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5.2.4 Policy on Measuring Instruction Latency for Value Prediction 83
5.2.5 Selective Value Prediction Experiments with Fault Injection . 84
5.2.6 Discussion about Fault Injection and AVF Computation . . . 94
5.3 Comparison with Fault Screening and Flush-on-L2-miss Techniques . 97
5.3.1 Summary of Fault Screening and Flush-on-L2-miss Techniques 98
5.3.2 Performance Impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
5.3.3 Fault Injection Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.3.4 Fault Detection Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
6 Related Work 110
6.1 Soft Computation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
6.2 Fault Susceptibility Characterization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
6.3 Analysis of Fault-Tolerance Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
6.4 Fault-Tolerance Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
6.4.1 Fault Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
6.4.2 Fault Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
6.4.3 Reducing Fault Susceptibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
6.5 Symptom of Potential Faults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
7 Conclusions 119
7.1 Summary and Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
7.2 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120




3.1 Breakdown of fault injections on architectural visibility. . . . . . . . . 31
3.2 Breakdown of program outcomes for architecturally visible fault in-
jections. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.1 Breakdown of program outcomes for lightweight recovery of crashes. . 41
4.2 Program execution time with traditional incremental checkpointing
or soft checkpointing technique. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.3 Program outcomes breakdown for soft recovery of crashes. . . . . . . 52
5.1 Diagram of Last Value Predictor. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
5.2 Diagram of Last Value Predictor. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
5.3 Diagram of Last Value Predictor. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
5.4 Accumulative Percentage of AVF and Instruction Count in Fetch
Buffer on TWOLF. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
5.5 Average distribution of result-producing instruction count, as well as
their prediction and misprediction rate, across different latency range
over all the 9 spec2000 integer benchmarks. Latency is measured from
fetch to issue stage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
5.6 Average AVF of 2 hardware structures and IPC (relative to orig-
inal execution) across 9 spec2000 integer benchmarks by applying
value prediction to long-latency instructions. Latency is measured
from fetch to issue stage. On value misprediction, mispredicted in-
structions and all subsequent ones are flushed and then re-fetch and
re-execute. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
5.7 Average distribution of value prediction rate–with confidence estimation–
across different latency range over all the 9 spec2000 integer bench-
marks. Latency is measured from fetch to issue stage. . . . . . . . . . 76
vii
5.8 Average AVF of 2 hardware structures and IPC (relative to original
execution) across 9 spec2000 integer benchmarks by applying value
prediction to long-latency instructions. Value predictor is comple-
mented with a separate confidence estimator. Latency is measured
from fetch to issue stage. On value misprediction, mispredicted in-
structions and all subsequent ones are flushed and then re-fetch and
re-execute. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
5.9 Average AVF of 2 hardware structures and IPC (relative to original
execution) across 9 spec2000 integer benchmarks by applying value
prediction to long-latency instructions. Latency is measured from
fetch to issue stage. Confidence threshold used for each prediction
varies (high, medium or low threshold) according to the instruction’s
latency. On value misprediction, mispredicted instructions and all
subsequent ones are flushed and then re-fetch and re-execute. . . . . . 80
5.10 Average IPC and AVF of 2 hardware structures across 9 spec2000
integer benchmarks by varying threshold of confidence estimation ac-
cording to instruction latency. Each set of values marked along X-
axis contains three latency thresholds, listed as lowest, medium, and
highest threshold, and associated with three confidence thresholds,
respectively– the three confidence thresholds are selected as described
in [1]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
5.11 Average AVF comparison of 3 policies for computing instruction latency–
instructions are selected by their latency for value prediction and con-
fidence estimation–on fetch buffer and issue queue (relative to original
execution) across 9 spec2000 integer benchmarks. Policy 1 stands for
latency computation from fetch to issue stage, policy 2 is for latency
from dispatch to writeback, and policy 3 is for latency from fetch
to writeback stage. The confidence threshold varies with instruction
latency. On value misprediction, mispredicted instructions and all
subsequent ones are flushed and then re-fetch and re-execute. . . . . . 84
5.12 Average IPC comparison of 3 policies for computing instruction latency–
instructions are selected by their latency for value prediction and con-
fidence estimation–on fetch buffer and issue queue (relative to original
execution) across 9 spec2000 integer benchmarks. Policy 1 stands for
latency computation from fetch to issue stage, policy 2 is for latency
from dispatch to writeback, and policy 3 is for latency from fetch
to writeback stage. The confidence threshold varies with instruction
latency. On value misprediction, mispredicted instructions and all
subsequent ones are flushed and then re-fetch and re-execute. . . . . . 85
viii
5.13 Breakdown of fault injections on fetch buffer by applying our selec-
tive value prediction technique. The minimum latency threshold for
prediction is 5 cycles, measured from fetch to issue stage. Confidence
threshold used for each prediction varies (high, medium or low thresh-
old) according to the instruction’s latency. On value misprediction,
all the instructions in the pipeline are flushed and then re-fetch and
re-execute. Categories include faults that have no architectural im-
pact (“non-effective”), faults that cause program to crash or deadlock
(‘fatal”), faults that are removed during pipeline flushes before faulty
instructions commit (“flushed”), and faults that are not detected by
value predictor before faulty instructions commit (“undetected”). . . 89
5.14 Breakdown of fault injections on issue queue by applying our selec-
tive value prediction technique. The minimum latency threshold for
prediction is 5 cycles, measured from fetch to issue stage. Confidence
threshold used for each prediction varies (high, medium or low thresh-
old) according to the instruction’s latency. On value misprediction,
all the instructions in the pipeline are flushed and then re-fetch and
re-execute. Categories include faults that have no architectural im-
pact (“non-effective”), faults that cause program to crash or deadlock
(‘fatal”), faults that are removed during pipeline flushes before faulty
instructions commit (“flushed”), and faults that are not detected by
value predictor before faulty instructions commit (“undetected”). . . 91
5.15 Breakdown of fault injections on physical register file by applying our
selective value prediction technique. The minimum latency threshold
for prediction is 5 cycles, measured from fetch to issue stage. Confi-
dence threshold used for each prediction varies (high, medium or low
threshold) according to the instruction’s latency. On value mispredic-
tion, all the instructions in the pipeline are flushed and then re-fetch
and re-execute. Categories include faults that have no architectural
impact (“non-effective”), faults that cause program to crash or dead-
lock (‘fatal”), faults that are removed during pipeline flushes before
faulty instructions commit (“flushed”), faults that occur on registers
while the most recent instructions updating the registers have com-
mitted (“committed, can’t recover”), and faults that are not detected
by value predictor before faulty instructions commit (“undetected”). . 92
5.16 Average MTTF over 9 benchmarks in fetch buffer, issue queue and
physical register file by applying our selective value prediction tech-
nique. The minimum latency threshold for prediction is 5 cycles,
measured from fetch to issue stage. Confidence threshold used for
each prediction varies (high, medium or low threshold) according to
the instruction’s latency. On value misprediction, all the instructions
in the pipeline are flushed and then re-fetch and re-execute. . . . . . 94
ix
5.17 Fault coverage estimation for fetch buffer by fault injection experi-
ments and AVF computation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
5.18 Fault coverage estimation for issue queue by fault injection experi-
ments and AVF computation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
5.19 IPC (relative to original execution) on 9 spec2000 integer benchmarks
with either value prediction, bit-invariance screening, or flushing on
L2 miss implemented. On value or bit-invariance misprediction, the
whole pipeline is flushed and then re-fetch after a 3-cycle penalty.
On L2 miss, all the instructions following the load miss are squashed
from the pipeline and they start to be re-fetch after the cache miss is
resolved. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
5.20 Breakdown of fault outcomes on fetch buffer, issue queue and physical
register file by applying value prediction, fault screening or flush-on-
L2-miss techniques. Categories include faults that have no architec-
tural impact (“non-effective”), faults that cause program to crash or
deadlock (‘fatal”), faults that are removed during pipeline flushes be-
fore faulty instructions commit (“flushed”), faults that occur on phys-
ical register file but the latest instruction which updates the corrupted
register has committed (‘committed, can’t recover”), and faults that
are not detected by value predictor or bit-invariance screener before
faulty instructions commit (“undetected”). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.21 Average MTTF over 9 benchmarks in fetch buffer, issue queue and
physical register file by applying value prediction, fault screening, or




IPC Instructions per Cycle
SEU Single-Event Upset
MTTF Mean Time to Failure
MTBF Mean Time between Failures
MITF Mean Instructions to Failure





As CMOS technology scaling continues to enable faster transistors and lower
supply voltage, tremendous improvements have been brought to microprocessor per-
formance and power consumption. However, one of the most striking downsides of
these trends is that computer systems become significantly more susceptible to hard-
ware faults–particularly, soft errors (also known as transient faults). As intermittent
faults, soft errors arise from strikes by cosmic particles and radiation from packaging
materials, and are more seriously endangering system reliability as the number of
on-chip transistors keeps growing exponentially. It is estimated that a chip’s error
rate will scale in proportion to the number of devices–i.e., with Moore’s Law [2].
To detect or recover from faults, there are basically two kinds of approaches.
The traditional approach explicitly replicates program computation or program
state, and uses the replicated program copy to detect or recover fault corruptions.
For example, to detect potential faults, additional hardware structures such as pro-
cessor cores, hardware contexts, and functional units [3, 4, 5, 6, 7] can be utilized,
or alternatively, program code is duplicated during compiling stage [8, 9, 10], thus
program computational outputs can be compared and checked for corruption. In
addition, for recovering potential faults, checkpointing is usually adopted to create
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additional copies of program state. Such duplication of program state can then be
used for rolling back program execution once a fault is detected. Unfortunately, for
both fault detection and recovery, although such approach of explicit replication can
be very accurate, it usually incurs a significant cost on either performance, power,
or hardware expense, etc.
Contrastingly, a relatively new approach exploits programs’ inherent redun-
dancy to improve fault tolerance, such as the technique that use symptoms like
branch misprediction as indication of possible fault corruptions [11]. Another tech-
nique, which is called fault screening, identifies value space of instructions’ compu-
tation, and triggers recovery if the instructions’ future outputs are not within the
recorded space [12]. Compared to the traditional approach, these techniques do not
replicate program computation or state, hence they incur very low overhead. But
they are not perfect–either the fault checkers are too sensitive and catch false posi-
tives, or they can not recover all possible faults. We call such techniques probabilistic
fault tolerance. Although the probabilistic techniques cannot achieve failure-safe ex-
ecution, they are still very useful for most general-purpose systems which do not
need perfect fault coverage but are very sensitive to cost. For such systems, these
techniques can reduce fault rate with small cost.
In this thesis, we contribute to existing probabilistic techniques by exploiting
two new sources of inherent program redundancy to improve fault tolerance [13, 14].
First, we find that many programs compute much more precisely than necessary. Al-
though traditional approaches to evaluating correctness require numerical integrity
of architectural state, in many cases, it is not necessary for program state to be
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numerically correct. Instead, program data may tolerate some errors, or there may
exist multiple values which all lead to correct program execution from the user’s
standpoint. This program characteristic is highly application dependent but we
find it occurs frequently in application domains that involve sensing data, such as
multimedia and artificial intelligence (AI) workloads. In such workloads, as long as
programs’ final outputs meet user’s requirement, they are acceptable even if their
numerical values are different from their fault-free versions. For example, some pre-
cision loss in outputs is tolerable to users if their precision requirements are lower
than the datatypes supported by the programming environment or hardware archi-
tecture. Also, program solutions that are not optimal but still adequate from the
user’s standpoint can be accepted as well. In our study, we call such standard of
correctness which is evaluated from the user or application level as application-level
correctness. In contrast to the traditional definition that views correctness at the
architecture level, application-level correctness is examined at a higher level of ab-
straction, thus allowing the existence of multiple correct outputs. Faults that cause
program execution to be numerically incorrect, but still produce one of the outputs
that are acceptable to users, can be tolerated.
In addition to the data redundancy at the application level, program com-
putations can also show a high degree of redundancy–i.e., instruction streams and
their output results often exhibit repeatability. Such redundancy has been tradition-
ally exploited for increasing instruction-level parallelism (ILP) to improve program
performance. One of the best examples of this is value prediction which has been
widely studied for boosting program performance, but has not yet been applied to
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fault tolerance. In our study, we find value prediction can be used to detect faults–
prediction results can be compared against the actual computation results, with
comparison mismatches indicating potential data corruptions.
In our study, we find it is beneficial to exploit both sources of program’s in-
herent redundancy for fault tolerance enhancement. In particular, we exploit redun-
dancy at the application level for lightweight fault-recovery mechanisms–our selec-
tive checkpointing technique only checkpoints a small part of program state while it
can successfully recover a large portion or most of program crashes. We also exploit
value predictability for low-cost fault detection–we take value prediction as another
form of program execution, and compare the results of value prediction and actual
computation to detect potential faults. In addition, we implement experiments to
explore the tradeoff between performance and reliability impacts.
The following texts briefly introduce application-level fault tolerance (Sec-
tion 1.1.1) and value prediction (Section 1.1.2) that have initiated our work.
1.1.1 Application-level Fault Tolerance
First, as we have discussed, application-level correctness enables the numerical
redundancy of program state from user’s standpoint. Compared to the traditional
architecture-level definition of correctness, application-level correctness allows more
faults to be tolerable as long as the final outputs can be accepted by users. Al-
though such property of additional fault tolerance at the user level can be found
in many important workloads, the degree of tolerating faults is application-specific.
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Different programs have different characteristics, thus they may appear more or
less resilient to faults. For instance, multimedia programs process human sensory
and perception information and are highly fault resilient at the application level.
Another example is artificial intelligence (AI) workloads, which have shown more
significance recently [15]. AI is a vast research area and includes many branches
such as reasoning, inference, and machine learning. As we will discuss later, AI
algorithms also exhibit a great deal of fault tolerance at the application level. All
these programs, e.g., multimedia and AI programs, belong to a class of computa-
tions which we call soft computations [16, 17]. Soft computations compute on inexact
or approximate data. Their outputs are associated with certain forms of qualita-
tive representations, which are usually interpreted by users. Certain faults which
may change the numerical values of those outputs do not change the corresponding
qualitative answers, thus are tolerable to users. Compared to soft computations,
programs which requires numerically exact outputs in order to be correct, such as
traditional scientific computations, may offer much less amount of fault resilience at
the application level.
Although the degree of error resilience at the application level varies across
different applications, we find all programs that we have studied exhibit some en-
hanced fault tolerance from user’s standpoint, including those that are traditionally
considered as exact computations–e.g., SPECInt CPU2000. Such application-level
fault tolerance could be exploited to avoid overdesign and achieve better tradeoff
between system reliability and performance cost.
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1.1.2 Value Prediction-based Fault Detection
Prior studies have shown that program execution including its instruction and
data streams exhibits another kind of redundancy–repeatability. One example of
applying such inherent redundancy is value prediction, which predicts instruction
results by learning their past values, thus breaks true data dependency. Unfortu-
nately, although value prediction seems promising, its effectiveness is weakened due
to its high misprediction penalty, which turns to be even worse as processor pipeline
becomes deeper.
In our study, we find such predictability in computational outputs can be ex-
ploited to improve system reliability. Compared to other redundant-execution tech-
niques, the biggest advantage of applying value prediction for result comparison and
fault detection is, by exploiting program’s inherent redundancy, it avoids the need
for explicitly duplicating hardware or program execution, thus evades related area
and power demands or performance degradation. Although value predictor itself
requires some additional hardware, we find a relatively small predictor is effective
in detecting faults. In addition, compared to the traditional applications of value
prediction which mainly pursue performance speedup, in the field of fault tolerance,
it is acceptable to trade between performance and reliability impact, which brings
more chances for value prediction. For example, in case of value misprediction, we
adopt the idea of flushing pipeline to try to recover fault corruptions. Although
flushing degrades program performance, it improves reliability when fewer valid bits
become vulnerable during flushing and re-execution. Moreover, unlike traditional
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applications that require value prediction results at the early stage of pipeline, for
detecting faults, value prediction can wait until the end of execution stage. All
these render much flexibility for adapting value predictor design to improve fault
tolerance.
In addition, by characterizing fault vulnerability at the instruction level–i.e.,
sorting instructions by how much they contribute to a hardware structure’s fault vul-
nerability during program execution, we find for the hardware structures we have
studied, a small portion of instructions accounts for a major fraction of program
vulnerability. For example, for fetch buffer in our processor model, about 3.5%
instructions contribute to 53.9% of total AVF for SPEC2000 benchmark TWOLF.
Therefore, by selectively protecting such a small portion of instructions from fault
corruption, the overall reliability can be enhanced greatly, while program perfor-
mance is much less affected than protecting all the instructions. We apply such
idea into our experiments–selectively predicting the most vulnerable instructions–to
achieve better fault coverage with smaller performance impact.
To further reduce performance cost caused by value misprediction and the con-
sequent pipeline flush, we utilize confidence estimator which allows value prediction
only when there is enough confidence in its correctness. We also incorporate the
fact that instructions do not contribute equally to reliability, and vary confidence
threshold accordingly–instructions that are more susceptible to faults use lower con-




This dissertation makes the following contributions.
Complete Study on Application-Level Correctness. In this work, we present
our study on exploring definitions of program correctness and their impacts on fault
tolerance. To characterize program susceptibility under different correctness defini-
tions, we implement fault injection experiments and measure how many more faults
program can tolerate under application-level correctness, compared to the tradi-
tional architectural correctness. Our results show that for soft computations, about
45.8% of fault injections that lead to architecturally incorrect execution produce ac-
ceptable results under application-level correctness. For SPEC programs, a smaller
portion of architecturally incorrect faults, 17.6%, produce acceptable results at the
application level. Such results indicate the degree of program-level redundancy that
provides additional fault tolerance.
Analysis on Sources of Application-Level Fault Tolerance. As discussed
by Mukherjee et al [18] and Wang et al [19], there are sources of masking at the
microarchitecture level as well as architecture level which reduce the probability that
faults affect program’s output. Our study exposes another level of fault masking–
the application level–from user’s standpoint. By analyzing program characteristics
as well as how faults propagate, we identify several sources of redundancy at the
application level which render additional fault tolerance.
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New Fault Recovery Techniques by Exploiting Application-Level Correct-
ness. We implement new fault recovery techniques by exploiting such additional
redundancy at the application level. One technique we propose is stack checkpoint-
ing which only saves program counter, architectural register file, and stack. Our
results show about 66.3% of program crashes in our multimedia and AI workloads
can be successfully recovered. Another mechanism we propose identifies program
state that are resilient to errors, which we call “soft” state. In our experiments,
we incrementally checkpoint state that are not marked as soft state and have been
updated during each checkpoint period. Our results show small additional perfor-
mance cost, compared to lightweight fault recovery, while almost all crashes in soft
computations are successfully recovered.
Characterizing Fault Vulnerability at the Instruction Level. In our study,
we characterize instruction’s vulnerability by computing the percentage of a hard-
ware structure’s average AVF (Architectural Vulnerability Factor) that an instruc-
tion relates to. We find that a small portion of instructions accounts for a major
fraction of program vulnerability. Thus, by selectively protecting such small portion
of instructions from fault corruption, the overall reliability can be enhanced greatly,
while program performance is affected much less compared to fully protection.
New Fault Detection Technique by Exploiting Value Predictability. We
apply value prediction for checking program computational results and consider mis-
prediction as symptom of potential fault. In our work, we only predict instructions
that have high vulnerability and squash pipeline on mispredictions to recover po-
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tential faults. To reduce possible fault positives that are caused by limitation of
value predictor itself, we implement confidence estimator to reduce misprediction
rate. In addition, by incorporating various vulnerability at the instruction level,
we propose adaptive confidence estimation–adjusting confidence threshold accord-
ing to instruction’s vulnerability. We analyze the impacts of value prediction and
confidence estimation on both aspects of program reliability and performance.
1.3 Road Map
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows.
Chapter 2 explains the background of our study about hardware faults and
fault tolerance research.
Chapter 3 analyzes application-level correctness and characterizes fault sus-
ceptibility at the application level, compared to the traditional architectural level.
In Chapter 4, we present our lightweight fault recovery as well as soft-checkpointing
recovery techniques.
Chapter 5 discusses our fault detection technique with value prediction. We
apply our selective value prediction (by instruction vulnerability) and adaptive con-
fidence mechanisms to detect potential faults. We evaluate both reliability and per-
formance impacts of our technique. In addition, we also implement fault injection
experiments to compare with other related work.
Chapter 6 lists the prior work related to our study, covering soft computa-
tion, fault susceptibility characterization, analysis of fault-tolerance sources, fault
10
detection and recovery techniques.






Hardware faults such as soft errors, lifetime reliability and process variation
problems, have always posed threats to normal functionality of semiconductor-based
digital systems. Such problems are becoming more serious as scaling in device size,
operating voltages and design margins continues. The following describes the nature
of these types of faults.
Transient Fault A transient fault, or soft error, is a signal or datum that is wrong,
but is not caused by hardware defect–mistake in design or construction, or broken
component. It is not a permanent failure–the occurrence of soft errors does not cause
permanent damage to hardware, and there is no implication on reliability reduction
of the system itself. On the contrary, it is temporary and intermittent fault, but
can still corrupt normal program execution.
Soft errors are mainly due to particle strikes such as alpha particles emitted
by decaying radioactive impurities in packaging and interconnect materials, ener-
getic neutrons and protons from cosmic rays, or thermal neutrons. When particles
travel through a semiconductor device, they release electron-hole pairs which can
be absorbed by transistor source and drain nodes and disturb the distribution of
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electrons there. If the disturbance is large enough, the state of a logic device–such
as an SRAM cell, a latch or a gate–can be changed from a 0 to a 1 or vice versa.
Soft errors have become a more challenging problem for future microprocessor
design. While the raw error rate per logic device remains small, a processor’s error
rate grows proportional to the number of transistors per chip which has kept scaling
with the rapid technology development [2].
Usually, soft errors are localized to a very small area of a chip, and only affect
the state of one logic node. This is known as a Single-Even Upset (SEU). We mainly
study this form of fault in our work.
Lifetime Reliability System lifetime reliability is impacted by wear-out based
failures, which are mainly caused by migration of metal atoms due to electro- or
mechanical stress, gate oxide wear down, or damage accumulated by thermal cy-
cling [20, 21].
Device scaling results in increased power density, and consequently, temper-
ature, which directly affect processor lifetime reliability. For example, the main
failure mechanisms including atom migration, gate oxide wear down and thermal
cycling, are adversely affected by increases in temperature, while the decreasing
feature size of interconnects accelerates failure rate due to electro-migration.
Process Variation Process variation is mainly caused by fluctuations in dopant
concentrations and device channel dimensions, which cause deviations in the man-
ufactured properties of the chip such as transistor size, threshold voltage or driving
capability, etc., thus affecting stability of circuit blocks [22].
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As devices scale with decreasing dimensions and growing transistor density,
device variation as well as the probability of deviations in longer critical path delay
increase, which will significantly affect performance, and more severely, compromises
reliability.
2.2 Fault Tolerance
Current fault tolerance research focuses primarily on characterizing fault sus-
ceptibility or developing fault detection and recovery techniques. This section dis-
cusses the nature of research in these areas.
2.2.1 Fault Susceptibility Characterization
To characterize a device’s susceptibility to faults, it is necessary to understand
how faults propagate in circuits after they hit devices. Traditionally, soft errors
were tackled within the context of memory cells, for which error detection and
correction circuits are widely used for protection. Combinational logic circuits, on
the other hand, have been found to be less susceptible to SEU due to the naturally
occurring masking effects: electrical masking, logical masking, and temporal (or
timing-window) masking. In particular, electrical masking attenuates affected signal
by the electrical properties of gates on the propagation path such that the resulting
pulse is of insufficient magnitude to be reliably latched; logical masking occurs when
the propagation of an SEU is blocked from reaching an output latch because off-path
gate inputs prevent a logical transition of that gate’s output; and temporal masking
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occurs when the erroneous pulse reaches an output latch, but it does not occur close
enough to when the latch actually samples its input.
Although these masking effects reduce the probability of soft errors to be
manifested, they are diminishing as device feature size decreases and circuits adopt
higher operating frequencies. As a result, recently more and more work has been
devoted to study the characteristics of fault susceptibility by building proper models
or implementing fault injection experiments, etc.
In addition to masking effects at the circuit level, there exist other sources
of masking such as those proposed by Mukherjee et al [18]. Mukherjee et al iden-
tified the effects of microarchitecture-level masking which come from mispeculated
instructions, predictor structure bits, and microarchitecturally idle bits. They also
identified masking effects at the architectural level–for example, faults on NOP
instructions, performance-enhancing instructions, dynamically dead code, and logi-
cally masked instructions. Faults on such microarchitecture structure and architec-
tural instructions do not affect program outputs.
To calculate fault susceptibility, there exist various metrics to specify Soft
error rate (SER). SER is the rate at which a device or system encounters or is
predicted to encounter soft errors. It is typically expressed as either the number of
failures-in-time (FIT), or mean-time-between-failures (MTBF). The unit adopted
for quantifying failures in time is called FIT, equivalent to 1 error per billion hours
of device operation. MTBF is usually given in years of device operation. To put it
in perspective, 1 year MTBF is equal to approximately 114,077 FIT.
MTBF can be further expressed as mean-time-to-failure (MTTF) and mean-
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time-to-repair (MTTR). Generally MTTR is ignorable compared to MTBF. Also
considering the fact that usually processor vendors have no control over factors
related to MTTR, MTTF is more frequently used for featuring fault susceptibility.
2.2.2 Fault Detection
Fault Detection is the process of discovering if a fault has occurred. Several
schemes exist to achieve fault detection. For example, error detection codes are
often used in data storage media, in which extra bits, referred to as check bits, are
utilized for storing information that is derived from data to be protected. Fault can
be detected by re-generating the check bits and comparing with the old check bits–a
mismatch on comparison indicates the occurrence of a fault. Examples of check bits
include parity bits, checksum, etc.
For more comprehensive comparison, dual modular redundancy (DMR) can be
employed at various levels to enable fault detection. DMR has duplicated elements
which work in parallel–the duplicated elements can range from replicated pipelines
within the same die to separate processors. At any time, all the replications of each
element should be in the same state: the same inputs are provided to each element,
and the same outputs are expected. To detect faults, the outputs of the replications
are compared using a voting circuit. A fault is detected when mismatch on output




Fault recovery is the process of limiting fault propagation and enabling the
service which restores system to an acceptable state. It can be accomplished in
two general ways. The first mechanism is forward-error recovery, in which enough
redundancy exists in the system to determine the correct operation. For example,
triple modular redundancy (TMR) utilizes three systems which perform the same
functions. Results of the three composing units are processed by a voting system to
produce a single output. Usually the voter is much more reliable than other TMR
components. When any one of the three systems fails–its result is different from
those produced by the other two systems. The remaining systems can correct and
mask the fault.
Another recovery mechanism is backwards-error recovery, which creates check-
points of system state and rollback program execution when an error is detected.
Checkpointing can be implemented by operating system, or at the user level, in-
corporating special checkpointing mechanism with the application program. It is
performed at a periodic interval by storing checkpoints to disk. If a failure occurs
which causes the application to be terminated prematurely, the stored (most-recent)
checkpoint can be used to restart the application–with the loss of computation dur-
ing a checkpoint interval.
To checkpoint an application, its state including values in memory, CPU regis-
ters, and the state of the operating system such as the file system, have to be saved.
Typically, the memory state can be divided into four parts: executable code, global
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variables, heap and stack. The global variables, heap and stack need to be stored
in checkpoint. As for the executable code, because it is usually unchanged since the
beginning of execution, it can be restored from the program’s executable file and
thus does not need to be saved every time.
To reduce checkpoint size as well as runtime overhead, incremental checkpoint-
ing uses page protection hardware to identify and only save the portion of pages that
have been updated since the previous checkpoint. Our recovery mechanism, which
is to be described in Section 4, is based on incremental checkpointing.
2.2.4 Partial Fault Detection/Recovery
Traditional fault-tolerance techniques aim at achieving perfect coverage–detecting
and recovering from all possible latent faults. However, for most systems such as
desktop computers or commodity servers, such high reliability is not necessary. On
the contrary, for those systems, performance and hardware cost appear to be more
crucial for customers. Thus recently, a lot of work has been committed to reducing




In this chapter, we present our work on characterizing programs’ fault sus-
ceptibility at the application level. We first discuss definitions of application-level
correctness (Section 3.1). Then we report our experimental methodology as well
as susceptibility results (Section 3.2). Lastly, we discuss various sources of fault
tolerance at the application level (Section 3.3).
3.1 Application-Level Correctness
This section presents our study on application-level correctness. We first dis-
cuss qualitative program outputs (Section 3.1.1). Then, we present various correct-
ness definitions which are used in our fault susceptibility experiments (Section 3.1.2).
3.1.1 Qualitative Program Outputs
Traditionally, program outputs are defined as all the numerical values that
are stored to memory at program completion. And program’s execution is said
to be correct as long as all the output values are the same as those obtained by
a fault-free execution. However, in many cases, only a small portion of the final
values need to be provided to users. Thus, state that are invisible to users do not
need to be correct. More interestingly, in a lot of cases, even the results that are
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presented to users do not need to be exact either. This commonly occurs in programs
computing results that are qualitatively interpreted by the user, such as multimedia
workloads which process human sensory information. In these programs, different
numerical results can lead to the same qualitative interpretation. Another example
is AI processing that applies artificial intelligence algorithms for reasoning, inference,
and learning, etc. These algorithms are approximate in nature, and errors in the
numerical answers may not affect the programs on drawing further conclusions(i.e.,
qualitative answers). For example, results of learning algorithms may be used for
classifying new datasets. Thus, numerically different results from learning could be
qualitatively correct if they lead to the same classification answers.
Not only soft computations like multimedia and AI programs have qualitative
outputs, but other general computations may also exhibit such properties. For
instance, many programs are designed to achieve the best performance, such as a
compression algorithm that tries to generate an output file as compact as possible.
However, the ultimate goal is to faithfully convert the compressed file back to the
original data. Hence, even if the compression process is not efficient and produces a
bigger compressed output, the user may still accept it if it leads to the same correct
result after decompression.
Furthermore, even qualitative answers can vary if they are acceptable at the
user(i.e., application) level. Considering multimedia applications again, outputs
which result in similar, although not the same, qualitative interpretation can be
deemed as correct as long as users are satisfied. The amount of acceptable error in
the output depends on users. This allows correctness to cease to be simply black or
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white; instead, we can speak of a degree of correctness determined by the amount
of tolerable error.
3.1.2 Correctness Definitions
Existing definitions of program correctness can be expanded by considering
solution quality interpreted at the user level. Below are possible correctness defini-
tions, listed in decreasing strictness.
I. Architectural state is numerically correct on a per-cycle (or per multiple-cycle)
basis.
II. Output state (i.e., architectural state visible after program completion) is
numerically correct.
III. Output state is qualitatively correct with high fidelity.
IV. Output state is qualitatively correct with acceptable fidelity.
Definitions I and II are two main traditional approaches used in fault toler-
ance research. They require program state, either intermediate or final results, to be
numerically exact compared to fault-free execution. Unlike the first two architecture-
level definitions, the remaining ones, definitions III and IV, are at the application
level, thus they are less strict. Both correctness definitions apply to programs pro-
ducing results that have a higher qualitative interpretation. More specifically, defi-
nition III requires outputs to be the same or very similar to the baseline output(i.e.,
high fidelity). The baseline output is defined as the result obtained from fault-free
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execution of a program. In other words, answers satisfying definition III do not
have noticeable quality degradation. Definition IV requires answers to have rel-
atively good fidelity compared to baseline solutions. Compared to definition III,
definition IV allows more tolerance of reduced answer quality.
As we have discussed in Section 3.1.1, programs with qualitative answers ex-
hibit more error resilience since their results are not directly tied to precise numerical
values. Errors in the numerical results may not be noticeable, or they may not signif-
icantly impact qualitative answers. Furthermore, under application-level correctness
definitions, i.e., definitions III and IV, the output acceptability can be customized
by users by varying the minimum fidelity necessary for a program output to be “ac-
ceptable.” Hence, users can accept more program outputs as “correct” by sacrificing
fidelity. Generally, the more tolerable the qualitative answer is to error, the more
reliable the program appears to be. As we will see in Section 3.2, this provides users
with a great opportunity to tradeoff solution quality for fault tolerance.
3.2 Fault Susceptibility Experiments
This section discusses the impact of application-level correctness on fault sus-
ceptibility. We conduct experiments to quantify how much more fault resilient
programs appear to be under application-level correctness compared to traditional
architecture-level correctness. We first present our experimental methodology in
Section 3.2.1, then discuss our results in Section 3.2.2.
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3.2.1 Experimental Methodology
To analyze program fault susceptibility under different correctness definitions
which have been described in Section 3.1.2, we perform statistical fault injection
experiments on selected benchmarks and analyze the effects of faults on a microar-
chitecture model. We also assume a Single Event Upset, or SEU, fault model,
throughout our experiments. In each fault injection experiment, a random single
bit flip fault is injected into the execution of one of the benchmarks. In order to
capture architectural effects of the faults more efficiently, we adopt the methodology
introduced by Reis et. al. [23] which uses a two-phase simulation technique. Similar
to [23], during the first fault injection phase, we inject faults into a detailed archi-
tectural simulator. Each time one fault is injected, we continue simulation until the
effects of the fault have been completely manifested in architectural state. Then, we
checkpoint the architectural effects, and continue to inject another fault. After we
have compiled the information across all the fault injections, in the second phase,
we use a simple functional simulator and replay each fault injection experiment that
has been recorded. More specifically, for each fault, we resume simulation with its
corresponding checkpoint, thus the architectural effects of the fault will keep prop-
agating while the program executes. In each simulation trial, we try to run the
program to completion. If the program does not crash, we evaluate its outputs un-
der both architecture- and application-level correctness. Note in our experiments,




Bandwidth 8-Fetch, 8-Issue, 8-Commit
Queue size 64-IFQ, 40-Int IQ, 30-FP IQ, 128-LSQ
Rename register / ROB 128-Int, 128-FP / 256 entry
Functional unit 8-Int Add, 4-Int Mul/Div, 4-FP Add, 2-FP Mul/Div
Memory port 4-Mem Port
Branch Predictor Parameters
Branch Predictor Hybrid 8192-entry gshare/2048-entry Bimodal
Meta Table / BTB / RAS Size 8192 / 2048 4-way / 64
Memory Parameters
IL1 config 64kbyte, 64byte block size, 2 way, 1 cycle latency
DL1 config 64kbyte, 64byte block size, 2 way, 1 cycle latency
UL2 config 1Mkbyte, 64byte block size, 4 way, 20 cycle latency
Mem config 300 cycle first chunk, 6 cycle inter chunk
Table 3.1: Parameter settings for the detailed architectural model into which we
inject faults.
Table 3.1 lists the settings for our detailed microarchitectural simulator, which
is a modified version of the out-of-order processor model from Simplescalar 3.0 for
the PISA instruction set [24]. Our modifications to the original simulator include
detailed modeling of rename registers and issue queues. Moreover, we mainly look
at fault injection effects on three hardware structures: the physical register file, the
fetch queue, and the issue queue. For faults occurring on physical registers, they do
not have any architectural effect if the registers they attack are idle or belong to mis-
peculated instructions, or the instruction outputs have not been written back yet.
Hence, throughout all the fault injection experiments on the detailed simulator, we
do not checkpoint any fault that has no architectural effect. Besides physical regis-
ters, we also simulate faults on the fetch queue. In our model, each fetch queue entry
is comprised of instruction bits including opcodes, register addresses, and immediate
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specifiers. Faults may occur anywhere, but only those that attack non-mispeculated
instructions impact architectural state, and are recorded accordingly. Lastly, for the
issue queue, we model 6 fields per entry: instruction opcode, 3 register tags (2 source
and 1 destination), an immediate specifier, and a PC value. Similar to the fetch
queue, faults on the issue queue (except for register tag field), affect architectural
state when the entries belong to non-mispeculated instructions. For the source or
destination register tags in the issue queue, corruptions corresponding to mispec-
ulated instructions can still affect architectural state because the corruptions alter
data dependence (even potentially to non-speculative instructions). Corruptions in
the opcode and immediate fields of each entry behave similarly to faults on the fetch
queue, while faults on the PC value affect computation for branch target addresses.
For each benchmark, we perform 3 detailed simulation runs and inject faults
to the 3 hardware structures including physical register file, fetch queue, and issue
queue, separately. In each run, we randomly inject faults into a single hardware
structure one after another. The time before injecting another fault is determined
by a uniformly distributed random variable. We also skip the initialization phase of
each benchmark for fault injection.
Table 3.2 lists all the benchmarks we have studied, as well as their input
datasets, numerical outputs and qualitative outputs. The first three benchmarks,
G.721-D, JPEG-D, and MPEG-D, are multimedia workloads, and are taken from the
Mediabench suite [25]. All three algorithms perform lossy decompression on audio,
image, and video data, respectively. Then, there are three AI workloads: LBP, SVM-
L, and GA. Loopy Belief Propagation (LBP) [26] is a well-known message-passing
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Benchmark Input Numerical Output Qualitative Output
Multimedia
G.721-D clinton.pcm Decompressed Segmental Signal-to-Noise
Audio Datafile Ratio (SNRseg)
JPEG-D lena.ppm Decompressed Peak Signal-to-Noise
Image Datafile Ratio (PSNR)
MPEG-D mei16v2.m2v Decompressed Peak Signal-to-Noise
Video Datafile Ratio (PSNR)
Artificial Intelligence
LBP WebKB [30] Page Belief Values Web Page Class Types
SVM-L LIBSVM(a1a) [31] Support Vector Model Test Data Class Types
GA r16-0.1.in [29] Thread Schedule Best Scheduling Time
SPECInt CPU2000
164.gzip test Compressed File Decompressed File
256.bzip2 train Compressed File Decompressed File
175.vpr test Cell Placement Placement Cost
Table 3.2: Input, numerical and qualitative outputs computed by our benchmarks.
algorithm for approximate inference on large Markov networks. It is widely used in
coding theory and combinatorial optimization. SVM-L is the learning portion of a
Support Vector Machine algorithm, called SVMlight [27]. SVM-L learns the param-
eters for a support vector (SV) model on a training dataset. The model is then used
for classification on new datasets. The last AI program, GA, is a genetic algorithm
applied to multiprocessor thread scheduling [28, 29]. Based on a task dependence
graph, the algorithm searches for a thread schedule in which each thread is assigned
a task, and the overall execution time across all threads is minimized. Finally, the
SPECInt CPU2000 workloads we study include two lossless data compression algo-
rithms, 164.gzip and 256.bzip2, and a place-and-route program, 175.vpr. Note in
our experiments, we configure the vpr program to only perform placement.
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In Table 3.2, the second column specifies the input dataset used for each
benchmark. The inputs are selected so that they won’t result in extremely long
execution time since we have to run each fault injection trial to completion during
the second phase of our two-phase simulation methodology. The third column in
Table 3.2 reports the numerical outputs computed by each benchmark, and the last
column reports the corresponding qualitative outputs that we have observed. For the
three multimedia programs, the numerical outputs are the decompressed datafiles,
either in audio, image, or video format. These decompressed datafiles, when played
back to the user, are interpreted by his/her human sensation, either aural or visual.
To evaluate the overall output quality experienced by users, we adopt signal-to-noise
ratio (SNR), a common quality metric in signal processing. More specifically, we
use segmental SNR for G.271-D to evaluate audio signal quality, and peak SNR for
JPEG-D and MPEG-D for image/video signal quality evaluation. It is possible for
different numerical outputs–the decompressed datafiles–to result in indistinguishable
or similar experience for the user, which means similar SNR values.
Like the multimedia workloads, the AI workloads also have qualitative program
outputs. In LBP, for each node in the graph, the algorithm computes a probabil-
ity distribution function over the possible class types. The numerical outputs for
LBP are the probability values across all the nodes. The qualitative outputs are
classification answers derived from the nodes’ probability distribution–the numerical
outputs. In particular, LBP selects a class type for each node by choosing the most
likely class indicated by the biggest probability value across the entire probability
distribution. In SVM-L, the numerical outputs are the SV model parameters learned
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from the training dataset. To obtain the class types we want, we run a separate
SVM classifier (not listed in Table 3.2) that uses the SV model computed by SVM-L,
and perform classification on a test dataset. Like LBP, for SVM-L, computing the
classification answers is an extremely inexact process. Multiple numerical outputs
(belief values for LBP and SV model parameters for SVM-L) can lead to the same
(and hence, valid) classification answer. Lastly, for GA, the numerical output is
the thread schedule the program computes. In most cases, the computed thread
schedule is an approximation to the optimal answer. This is because the program
has a solution space which is too big to explore exhaustively in practice. Thus the
algorithm adopts a heuristic approach and produces a relatively good answer. The
thread scheduling cost can reflect how good the computed answer is. Thus it is pos-
sible that many thread schedules are adequate with acceptable cost. And any one of
these good enough answers represent a valid output from the user’s perspective. In
Table 3.2, we use the thread scheduling cost as the algorithm’s qualitative output.
More interestingly, even the three SPEC programs also allow multiple valid
outputs, although they are traditionally considered as exact computations. Both
the data compression programs, 164.gzip and 256.bzip2, are lossless algorithms and
have to compute exact decompressed datafiles. Nevertheless, there is flexibility in
how datafiles are compressed even though the compression algorithms themselves
are exact. In other words, the compressed file, which is a numerical output, could
be different and still lead to exactly the same datafile after decompression. We con-
sider the decompressed file as the programs’ qualitative result. Valid execution is
allowed to produce a different compressed file but the same original datafile must
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be re-produced after decompression. Hence we use the compression ratio to reflect
compression efficiency of each valid execution in our experiments. The vpr bench-
mark tries to find a cell block placement for a chip design. Like GA, vpr’s algorithm
is heuristic-based since finding an optimal placement (one that minimizes intercon-
nect distance) is intractable. Therefore, multiple cell block placements are valid. To
evaluate valid execution, we use a consistency check provided by the vpr code itself.
This function first checks whether a given placement for all the cell blocks is valid
(i.e., doesnot violate any design rules), and then if it is valid, the checker computes
the cost for the given placement. We use the computed cost as the output quality
for vpr.
All the numerical and qualitative outputs listed in Table 3.2 are used in
the second phase of our fault injection experiments to evaluate program execu-
tion correctness–under both architecture and application level, respectively. We
will present our results in the next section.
3.2.2 Fault Susceptibility Result
In the first phase of our fault injection experiments, we inject faults to the
detailed simulator and checkpoint the affected state. In all, our fault injection cam-
paign performs 156,205 fault injections–52,555 for physical register file, 52,229 for
fetch buffer, and 51,421 for issue queue across all the benchmarks. However, not
all faults result in visible architectural effects–only a small portion of the injected
faults affect program architectural state. Many faults are masked at the microarchi-
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tecture level. As discussed by Mukherjee et al [18], microarchitecture-level masking
is mainly due to faults that attack idle hardware resources, or hardware resources
occupied by mispeculated instructions.
Figure 3.1 breaks down all the fault injection experiments by whether they
are architecturally visible or not. In Figure 3.1, fault injection experiments on each
benchmark are grouped together, with each group consisting of three bars represent-
ing experiments on the physical register file, fetch queue, and issue queue, labeled
“R,” “F,” and “I,”respectively. The last 3 groups of bars report the average across
each category of benchmarks, i.e., the multimedia, AI, and SPEC benchmarks, re-
spectively. We can see that the degree of masking at the microarchitecture level
varies considerably across different benchmarks and hardware structures. But on
average, across all the hardware structures and all the benchmarks, only 17.3% of
injected faults (27,067 out of 156,205) become architecturally visible. Among all
the structures, the fetch queue exhibits the most sensitivity to faults, with 22.6%
faults being architecturally visible; while the register file and issue queue are less
sensitive, with 12.1% and 17.3% faults resulting in visible architectural effects, re-
spectively. Faults that are masked at the microarchitecture level produce exact
program outputs that are correct under both architecture- and application-level
correctness definitions.
Next, we evaluate program output correctness to further examine the archi-
tecturally visible faults. Figure 3.2 breaks down the outcome of all fault injection
experiments that have visible architectural effects. Note those outcomes are ob-
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Figure 3.1: Breakdown of fault injections on architectural visibility.
possible. Figure 3.2 is presented in the same way as Figure 3.1, except that each
bar in Figure 3.2 is now broken down into 6 categories. The first category, labeled
“Architecture,” indicates the portion of experiments which have program outputs
that pass architecture-level correctness (definition II in Section 3.1.2). Naturally,
these outputs are also correct at the application level. The next two categories,
labeled “Application-High” and “Application-Good,” represent the portions of ex-
periments which have incorrect outputs under architecture-level correctness, but are
acceptable under application-level correctness (definition III and IV in Section 3.1.2,
respectively). In our experiments, we set the thresholds for “Application-High” and
“Application-Good” to be 1% and 5% error, respectively, when comparing programs’
qualitative outputs to fault-free execution. Exceptions are JPEG-D and MEPG-D,
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Figure 3.2: Breakdown of program outcomes for architecturally visible fault injec-
tions.
“Application-Good” means PSNR is between 90dB and 50dB, when compared to the
original output. The next category, labeled “Incorrect”, reports those program out-
comes that are incorrect under both architecture- and application-level correctness.
Finally, the last two categories indicate experiments that cannot complete during
functional simulation: the category labeled “Crash” reports experiments which have
failed because of exception or hardware lockup, while the category labeled “Termi-
nate” reports trials in which programs have detected errors themselves and decided
to exit early. Note in our simulations, program lockups are detected via expiration
of watchdog timers that are set at the beginning of major loops in each benchmark.
From Figure 3.2, we see a large portion of architecturally visible faults lead
to correct program outputs under architecture-level correctness (i.e., the “Archi-
tecture” components). The last 3 groups of bars in Figure 3.2 show on average
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that architecture-level correctness is achieved in 50.4% to 60.0% of program outputs
across the 3 hardware structures for the multimedia and SPEC benchmarks, and
in 61.0% to 68.8% for the AI benchmarks. Those faults only affect architectural
state that are unnecessary for maintaining numerical integrity in our computations,
and become architecturally masked as program’s execution proceeds. In our bench-
marks, the primary source of architecture-level masking is logical and inequality in-
structions. These instructions seldom change their computation results despite data
corruptions to their input operands; thus, they are highly fault resilient. Similarly,
faults may also be masked by shift or bitwise operations. Other (less significant)
sources of architecture-level masking include dynamically dead code, NOP instruc-
tions, and Y-branches [19]. Additionally, we find memory operations also contribute
to fault masking, such as partial stores in which corruptions occur in part of the
data which is not stored to the memory, thus they have no impact on memory in-
tegrity; or load instructions which are supposed to load data which are common in
memory (for example, zero), therefore corrupted load addresses may point to other
locations which fortunately contain the same data value. Both microarchitecture-
and architecture-level masking have been previously observed by other fault suscep-
tibility studies [18, 32, 19].
For the remaining portions of experiments with final results produced, faults
are not masked at both microarchitecture and architecture levels, thus they do not
lead to numerically correct outputs. These faulty outcomes have traditionally been
considered incorrect under architecture-level correctness. In our study across all
benchmarks and all hardware structures, on average about 41.2% of architecturally
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visible fault injections are architecturally incorrect. However, we find among those
architecturally incorrect outcomes, a significant portion still yield fairly good solu-
tion quality. This is particularly true for soft computations, the multimedia and AI
benchmarks in our study. While these program outputs are incorrect numerically
(i.e., they are incorrect at the architecture level), they are completely acceptable
from user’s standpoint (i.e., they are correct at the application level). Overall,
45.8% of architecturally incorrect faults in our soft computations are tolerable un-
der application-level correctness.
More interestingly, not only soft computations, but also traditionally exact
computations, i.e., SPEC benchmarks in our study, exhibit enhanced fault resilience
at the application level. As the last group of bars in Figure 3.2 shows, for the SPEC
benchmarks, overall 17.6% of additionally acceptable faults are achieved across all
hardware structures. Although our results in Figure 3.2 show that SPEC bench-
marks offer less additional fault resilience at the application level compared to soft
computations, they still indicate that application-level correctness can generally help
to enhance program fault tolerance.
3.3 Sources of Fault Tolerance
Section 3.2.2 demonstrates that a significant portion of faults that lead to
numerically incorrect results are in fact perfectly acceptable to the user, and are
no longer perilous at the application level. There are many factors that enable
such additional error resilience. In our study, we find in addition to the existence of
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qualitative program outputs that have been discussed in Section 3.1.1, there are also
algorithmic properties that contribute to application-level fault tolerance. We have
identified the following properties which are common in applications, especially in
soft computations.
I. Redundancy. Computations that are iterative or that exhibit reduced preci-
sion (see below) often contain some degree of redundancy. Unlike dead code,
these redundant computations contribute to the application result, but may
not improve answer quality appreciably. Programs with redundant computa-
tions are more error resilient because the redundancy can mask faults.
II. Adaptivity. Many soft computing algorithms are already designed to deal
with errors. This is particularly common in algorithms that compute on noisy
or probabilistic data. Such soft computations include code to detect certain
forms of error, and adapt the computation accordingly. Therefore, they are
naturally error resilient.
III. Reduced Precision. Programs often have precision requirements that are
lower than the datatypes supported by the programming environment or hard-
ware architecture. Such computations are resilient to errors that modify data
values within the precision tolerance.
IV. Efficiency-aimed Computation. Some codes are designed for the goal of
improving program efficiency, and do not closely relate to result accuracy.
Corruptions on that kind of computation are tolerable in the sense that they
only impact program performance, not output correctness.
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V. Sub-Independence. Some algorithms are comprised of separate parts of
computations which do not depend on each other. Even if faults occur on some
parts of these computations, other parts could still execute normally, thus the
final results may still be acceptable if the overall disturbance is minor.
We find that these algorithmic sources of fault tolerance, together with qual-
itative program outputs, not only help to mask many architecturally unacceptable
faults so that they are now acceptable at the application level, but also contribute




Fault Recovery by Exploiting Application-level Correctness
This chapter presents our work on fault recovery by exploiting application-
level correctness. First, Section 4.1 proposes a light-weight recovery technique by
only checkpointing the program counter, register file and stack, periodically. Then
Section 4.2 extends the technique by identifying “soft” state in programs and ex-
cluding them from checkpoints. In Section 4.3, both performance and cost of such
recovery mechanisms are reported.
4.1 Lightweight Fault Recovery
As discussed in Section 3.2.2, many architecturally incorrect faults are ac-
ceptable when examined at the application level. However, even after considering
application-level correctness, a large portion of faults still lead to incorrect program
execution–i.e., the “Incorrect,” “Crash,” and “Terminate” components in Figure 3.2.
Of these, by far the “Crash” component is the most significant portion. In all but
three bars (the “R” and “F” bars for gzip, and the “R” bar for bzip2), the “Crash”
component dominates. From Figure 3.2, we can see that across all benchmarks and
all hardware structures, on average crashes account for 80.8% of faults that are in-
correct at both the architecture and application levels. Techniques that can address
crashes will have a large impact on fault tolerance as fault rates keep increasing in
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the future. Additionally, the “Terminate” category of trials is similar to the “Crash”
category in the sense that both exit prematurely and have no or only part of out-
puts generated. The main difference between the two categories lies in whether the
application itself has been implemented to detect certain forms of errors and exits
early accordingly. Therefore, techniques that can address crashes may also be able
to deal with faults in the “Terminate” category as well. In this work, we only look
at recovering faults leading to program crashes; more work needs to be done for
specific applications in order to deal with program “Termination.”
In our mechanism, crashes manifest themselves as either exceptions or program
lockups. Program lockups are detected via expiration of watchdog timers that are
set at the beginning of major loops in each program. To recover from faults, we find
that lightweight checkpoints can be effective thanks to the existence of algorithmic
sources of fault tolerance, as well as qualitative program outputs discussed in Sec-
tion 3.3. Next, we will discuss our lightweight recovery technique in Section 4.1.1,
and then present our results in Section 4.1.2.
4.1.1 Lightweight Recovery Mechanism
Once a fault occurs and before it is detected, corruptions may propagate any-
where in the computation. While recovering all the modified data is necessary for
architecture-level correctness, it is overly conservative for application-level correct-
ness because soft computations, as a result of the algorithmic properties discussed
in Section 3.3, are resilient to data corruptions, and program outputs do not need
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to be numerically perfect.
To reduce checkpoint overhead, in our mechanism, we only checkpoint the
portion of state that is necessary for restarting program execution. More specifically,
we find that in most cases, only a valid PC, architected register file, and program
stack are enough for successful recovery. Once a crash is detected, we roll back
program state including PC, register file, and stack, to the nearest checkpoint, and
then restart the program–we do not touch other state such as program text, static
data, or heap during rollback. Our checkpoints are instrumented at the beginning
of the main controlling loops in our benchmarks.
Note, in our lightweight recovery mechanism, we checkpoint program state
heuristically, and it is possible that some state necessary for program restart are
not saved in our checkpoint, thus some crashes may not be recoverable. However,
the main advantage of our technique is that it is very cheap compared to a per-
fect fault tolerance technique which requires us to identify all the state that are
necessary to recover all possible crashes, and save them frequently enough. In our
technique, across all the benchmarks, the average checkpoint size is 3 Kbytes, and
only accounts for 0.4% of the total program state. Furthermore, our checkpoints are
incurred very infrequently since we only instrument checkpoints at the beginning of
the main controlling loops in each program: there are at least 400,000 instructions
between consecutive checkpoints. Moreover, as we can see in the next section, our
recovery mechanism is not only lightweight, but also very effective and can success-
fully recover a significant portion of crashes in many cases.
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4.1.2 Lightweight Recovery Results
We perform recovery for all crash trials (“Crash” component in Figure 3.2),
using the functional simulator which is instrumented with our lightweight checkpoint
mechanism. Each time a program crash is detected, as described in Section 4.1.1, we
rollback to the nearest checkpoint, restart execution, and try to run the benchmark
to completion. If the program doesnot crash again, we evaluate its outputs under
both architecture- and application-level correctness, just as we have done in Sec-
tion 3.2.2. Figure 4.1 breaks down the outcome of our recovery experiments. Each
bar, representing experiments on one hardware structure for one benchmark, is bro-
ken down into the same categories as Figure 3.2, except that there is no “Terminate”
category since none of our recovery experiments end in early program exit. The last
3 groups of bars in Figure 4.1 report the average breakdowns for the multimedia,
AI, and SPEC benchmarks, respectively.
First, Figure 4.1 shows that our lightweight recovery technique is helpful even
with traditional numerical correctness. A number of program crashes can be re-
covered successfully and generate exact outputs under architecture-level correctness
(i.e., the “Architecture” components). For soft computations, the multimedia and
AI benchmarks, on average about 3.8% to 17.7% of recoveries are architecturally
correct, while for SPEC programs, architecture-level correctness is achieved on av-
erage from 21.5% to 30.8% of all recoveries. By examining these experiments more
carefully, we find that in most cases, faults have not corrupted uncheckpointed state
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Figure 4.1: Breakdown of program outcomes for lightweight recovery of crashes.
can correct corruptions on state that have been checkpointed, and allows program
to complete with numerically perfect outputs.
Furthermore, our lightweight recovery technique can be even more helpful
under application-level correctness. Figure 4.1 shows that a significant number
of additional crashes can be recovered correctly with the application-level correct-
ness definitions (i.e., the “Application-High” and “Application-Good” components).
This is especially true for soft computations. Look at the average bars for the mul-
timedia and AI benchmarks in Figure 4.1. On average, about 34.8% to 73.8% of
recoveries are correct under application-level correctness, although their numeri-
cal outputs are incorrect under architecture-level correctness. Moreover, across all
hardware structures and all soft computations, an additional 52.6% of recoveries are
acceptable under application-level correctness. Combining both numerically correct
41
and qualitatively correct recoveries, for soft computations, our lightweight recov-
ery technique allows on average about 66.3% of all crashes to complete correctly.
In addition, combining results from Figure 3.2, with our definition of application-
level correctness and lightweight recovery mechanism, for soft computations, about
92.4% of all architecturally visible faults are acceptable. That is, they still lead
to correct outputs at either the architecture or application level. However, for the
SPEC benchmarks, our lightweight recovery mechanism does not perform as well as
for soft computations. As shown in the last group of bars in Figure 4.1, at most an
additional 2.5% of all recoveries are acceptable under application-level correctness,
on top of the numerically correct recoveries. This shows again that soft computa-
tions are resilient to errors while exact computations like the SPEC benchmarks are
not.
In summary, application-level correctness can enhance program fault tolerance
even when infrequently checkpointing a small amount of program state. The ben-
efit is more significant for programs which have multiple valid outputs as well as
algorithmic properties for fault resilience (i.e., soft computations).
4.2 Soft Checkpoint Mechanism
As we have presented in Section 3.2.2, programs can tolerate more errors
under application-level correctness compared to the traditional architectural-level
correctness. Furthermore, Section 4.1.1 shows that in case of fatal faults, only
restoring a small set of program state can help program to restart and still generate
42
acceptable outputs. However, our lightweight recovery mechanism is not perfect in
that it is not able to recover all the crashes even for soft computations (Section 4.1.2).
The problem is mainly caused by the fact that our lightweight checkpoints are
too simple to contain all the state necessary for program’s normal execution–i.e.,
faulty corruption of some state that are not included in the checkpoints can prevent
program from generating acceptable outputs. Thus, in order to achieve successful
recovery on most crashes, it is crucial to identify the portion of state that have
to be exact for proper program execution, or on the contrary, the portion of state
that are highly resilient to errors–omitting them from checkpoints does not sacrifice
program correctness at the application level. In this work, we call the latter “soft
state”, and refer to all other program state as “hard state”. For many applications
such as the soft computations in our study, soft state only constitute part of the
whole program state, thus rendering the possibility of selectively checkpointing hard
state to achieve smaller checkpoint size and cheaper recovery cost compared to
traditional full checkpointing. In addition, to maintain recovery performance via
soft checkpointing, hard state have to be identified throughout the whole program,
which requires complete and accurate code analysis. In our experiments, we bypass
such high requirement by identifying soft state and assuming all other program
state as hard state. Thus, incompleteness in our analysis only affects checkpointing
cost since less soft state are to be omitted from checkpoints, while the recovery
performance is not influenced.
In this section, we mainly present our study on two key issues in implementing
such soft checkpointing technique. First, Section 4.2.1 discusses how to identify
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soft program state. Then, Section 4.2.2 reports our checkpointing and recovery
mechanism.
4.2.1 Soft Program State
Soft state are those that can be inexact–in other words, their numerical values
can be different from fault-free execution–while programs can still generate valid
outputs. Once soft state are identified, checkpoint cost–either its size or performance
overhead, as well as fault recovery cost–can be improved by excluding the soft state
from checkpoints. Note the soft state we discuss here are not dead or read-only
data which have been explored in previous work such as [33, 34]. Unlike dead data
which comprise values that are irrelevant to program execution, or read-only data
which contain the same values since the last checkpoint, errors in soft state do
change program execution–usually they may cause program to produce numerically
different outputs. Those errors are intolerable under traditional architectural-level
correctness. However, at higher levels of abstraction, i.e. at the application level,
they may be tolerated if the corresponding outputs still fulfill user’s requirements.
To identify soft program state, generally there exist two approaches. The first
approach comes from the observation that most soft state directly relate to soft
program outputs, which are also referred to as qualitative outputs in Chapter 3
due to the qualitative nature of the results. Therefore, given information on soft
program outputs, backward dependence analysis can be applied to collect all possible
data that contribute to soft outputs. Although it is possible some state are error-
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resilient even if they do not directly compute soft outputs, such cases are not common
and most soft state can be identified in this fashion. The other approach, which
is easier to implement, relies on programmer’s knowledge to inspect the code and
identify data structures associated with soft outputs. Such approach is similar to the
technique proposed by [33, 34] in which programmer gives directions on excluding
or including memory regions to checkpoints. One concern with such approach is
that programmer may mistakenly mark non-error-resilient data structures as soft.
However, such mistakes can be avoided if the programmer is conservative in selecting
soft data. In our experiments, we take the second method and our results presented
in Section 4.3 show our technique is effective in checkpointing necessary state for
recovery.
In addition, in selecting soft state, we only examine heap data structures since
they are the main sources of soft program state across our benchmarks. Other
memory state including static data and stack are ignored in our analysis, though
the PC, register file, and stack are automatically included in the checkpoints (similar
to our lightweight checkpointing mechanism).
4.2.2 Soft Recovery Mechanism
As we have mentioned, our soft checkpoints include the PC, register file, and
stack–we save them fully at each checkpoint since their size is usually very small and
thus this introduces little overhead. In addition, our soft checkpoints also include
hard state existing in other parts of memory such as static data and heap. Unlike
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register file or stack, these memory regions generally involve huge amounts of data.
Hence, instead of using full checkpoints, we employ incremental checkpointing. In-
cremental checkpointing is traditionally one of the most efficient ways to checkpoint
program state. It works by maintaining a list of objects that have been updated
since the most recent checkpoint. To establish a new checkpoint, only the dirty
objects on the list are saved, thus eliminating redundant copies. After each check-
point, the list is cleared so that it can be used to track dirty objects for the next
checkpoint. In our mechanism, we only maintain the list to keep track of updates
on hard state.
Although ideally only updates on hard state are to be checkpointed, the gran-
ularity at which modifications of hard state are tracked impacts the size of the
checkpoints–usually the coarser granularity updates on hard state are examined,
the bigger the resulting checkpoints are, as well as the related performance over-
head. However, to achieve finer granularity, more hardware are required to maintain
the list of dirty objects. In our study, we track modifications of hard state at page
granularity, thus the hardware in TLBs for tracking dirty pages can be utilized for
our purpose. While this is cost effective, it also incurs some overhead since most
data objects are smaller than a page. We will discuss more about this later.
To distinguish modifications on hard state, we identify store instructions that
write to the data structures containing soft state. We refer to these store instruc-
tions as “soft stores”. All other stores not identified as soft stores are conservatively
assumed to update to hard state, and are identified as hard stores. The data struc-
tures for soft state are collected by examining the code and picking those structures
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that are associated with soft outputs (the soft outputs for our benchmarks are listed
in Table 3.2). Once soft stores have been identified, we mark them in our bench-
marks’ binaries so that they can be recognized at runtime. In our experiments,
this is achieved by creating new instructions with unused opcodes in the simulated
instruction set, and then replacing the original soft stores. As we will explain in the
next section, this enables our soft recovery technique to omit dirty pages which are
only touched by soft stores, thus saving checkpoint size and overhead.
4.3 Soft Recovery Results
In our experiments, we modified our detailed out-of-order simulator from
Chapter 3 to support incremental checkpointing. As our simulator does not model
TLBs which are normally used for incremental checkpointing, we track dirty pages
in the simulator itself instead. For every executed store instruction, our simulator
first checks whether it is a soft store or not; if it is not, the simulator then observes
which memory page the store writes to (assuming 4,096 bytes per memory page).
Once a memory page is found to be modified for the first time, the simulator ap-
pends its page number to a modified page list. At each checkpoint, the modified
page list is traversed and the recorded dirty pages are checkpointed using a copy
function. The copy function also checkpoints the PC, register file, and stack. In
addition, the copy function is executed at runtime and fully simulated, thus the
performance cost it incurs can be evaluated.
This section presents the results by applying our soft recovery mechanism to
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Bench Total Pages Dirty Pages Dirty Pages Dirty Blocks Dirty Hard Blocks
G.721-D 6 3 (0.50) 3 (1.0) 13 13 (1.0)
JPEG-D 222 14 (0.063) 7 (0.50) 369 146 (0.40)
MPEG-D 244 8 (0.033) 2 (0.25) 216 20 (0.093)
LBP 1906 1444 (0.76) 1 (6.9e-4) 33633 1 (3.0e-5)
SVM-L 237 34 (0.14) 19 (0.56) 578 359 (0.62)
GA 11779 46 (0.039) 38 (0.83) 349 46 (0.13)
Table 4.1: Checkpoint size statistics. “Total Pages” reports the total number of
memory pages allocated in each benchmark. “Dirty Pages” reports the average num-
ber of pages that are updated during one checkpoint period after program initiation,
which corresponds to the traditional incremental checkpoint size. (The numbers in
parentheses are fractions of the total pages.) “Dirty Hard Pages” reports the aver-
age number of pages in which non-soft blocks are updated during each checkpoint
period, corresponding to our soft-checkpoint size. And the numbers in parentheses
are fractions of the dirty pages. The last two columns, “Dirty Blocks” and “Dirty
Hard Blocks”, report the average size of updated memory–and the non-soft part,
separately–during one checkpoint period by the number of memory blocks. For the
latter, the numbers in parentheses are fractions of the dirty blocks.
the soft computations in our study–i.e., multimedia and AI workloads. We first
report the soft checkpoint cost, including checkpoint size and the impact of check-
pointing on program execution time (Section 4.3.1). Then, we demonstrate how
effective our soft checkpointing technique is in recovering program crashes. We also
discuss some observations from our experiments (Section 4.3.2).
4.3.1 Soft Checkpoint Cost
We evaluate two aspects of checkpoint cost–the size of checkpoints, as well as
the performance overhead they cause on each program. In order to compare our
soft checkpointing with the traditional incremental checkpointing, we first run each
benchmark on our detailed out-of-order simulator to acquire checkpoints assuming
no soft store instructions; then, we run each benchmark again and acquire check-
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points omitting modifications by soft stores. Note the checkpoint locations are the
same as those described in Section 4.1.1.
Table 4.1 presents the average size of checkpoints for each soft computation
program in our study. In the table, the column labeled “Total Pages” reports
the total number of memory pages allocated in each benchmark, excluding code
segment and stack. The column labeled “Dirty Pages” shows the average number of
pages that have been updated during one checkpoint period after program initiation
(the numbers in parentheses are the fractions over the total pages)–these numbers
reflect the size of traditional incremental checkpointing. On average, only 25.6% of
all the pages are modified between two checkpoints. In comparison to traditional
checkpointing, the column labeled “Dirty Hard Pages” reports the average number
of pages which have been modified by hard store instructions during each checkpoint
period–the numbers in parentheses are the fractions over the dirty pages. The table
shows for most of the soft computations, only saving memory pages that contain
updated hard data reduces checkpoint size significantly–for some benchmarks such
as LBP, almost all of the updated data are error-resilient, which results in extremely
small checkpoints compared to traditional incremental checkpoint. But for other
benchmark such as G.721-D, updated hard data are distributed through all of the
memory pages, thus there is no reduction on checkpoint size after considering data
softness. On average, soft checkpoints are about 52.3% of the size of conventional
incremental checkpoints.
Moreover, if we checkpoint at finer level of granularity–i.e., saving updated










































Figure 4.2: Program execution time with traditional incremental checkpointing or
soft checkpointing technique.
Table 4.1, the columns labeled “Dirty Blocks” and “Dirty Hard Blocks” present
the average number of memory blocks that require copying under traditional incre-
mental checkpointing and our soft checkpointing technique, respectively. (For the
column labeled ‘Dirty Hard Blocks”, the numbers in parentheses are the fractions
over the dirty blocks.) Compared to checkpointing by memory pages, for most of
the applications, checkpointing by memory blocks results in smaller checkpoint size.
On average, the space required by soft checkpoints is only about 37.4% of what
incremental checkpoints need. However, as we have discussed, using smaller check-
point granularity incurs more hardware overhead, such as bits for recording update
status.
Because soft checkpointing requires much less data to be saved, its runtime
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overhead for saving checkpoints is also much smaller. Figure 4.2 shows our results
on performance overhead. For each benchmark, which corresponds to one group of
bars in the graph, we report the execution time (cycles) with traditional incremen-
tal checkpointing or our soft checkpointing technique, normalized to the original
(no checkpointing) program execution. The last group of bars exhibits the average
results across all the benchmarks. The graph shows for each application, comparing
the traditional and our checkpointing techniques, their runtime overhead is approx-
imately consistent with their checkpoint size reported in Table 4.1. On average,
the traditional incremental checkpointing incurs about 10.5% runtime overhead on
program execution, while our soft checkpointing technique only causes about 3.3%
overhead, which shows the benefit from the smaller size of our soft checkpoints.
4.3.2 Soft Recovery Performance
Not only does soft checkpointing cost less in terms of both space require-
ment and performance overhead, it also works effectively in recovering program
crashes. Recall in our mechanism, upon program crashes, we restore program state
with the latest soft checkpoint, and then resume program execution. We apply
soft checkpointing and recovery to all the program crashes from our fault injection
experiments, which are reported in Section 3.2.2. Figure 4.3 breaks down the pro-
gram outcomes of our fault recovery experiments. The results are presented in the
same manner as Figure 4.1 except we use soft checkpointing for recovery instead of
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Figure 4.3: Program outcomes breakdown for soft recovery of crashes.
Figure 4.3 shows with soft recovery, almost all the program crashes are recov-
ered and programs resume their execution until the end of these execution. The
portions of “Crash” after recovery are reduced greatly–at most 1.1% across the
benchmarks. Especially for multimedia applications, all the experiments can pick
up their execution until producing outputs after restoring soft checkpoint. In ad-
dition, among all the experiments generating outputs, the majority are counted as
correct under either architectural or application-level correctness. Look at the av-
erage bars listed in the last two groups in Figure 4.3. On average, about 79.2% to
98.8% of recoveries are correct at the application level. In particular, about 81.3% of
all the crashes in multimedia programs, or 98.0% for AI programs, are successfully
recovered to either architecturally correct or qualitatively correct, resulting in about
89.7% for successful recoveries across all hardware structures and all soft compu-
52
tations. Compared with lightweight recovery reported in Figure 4.1, which has a
66.3% recovery rate under application-level correctness across all the experiments,
soft checkpointing successfully recovers an additional 23.4% of program crashes,
while its performance overhead is very low–about 3.3% as reported in Figure 4.2.
Although soft checkpointing appears very effective in recovery, it is still not
perfect in recovering all program crashes. In particular, Figure 4 shows a very
small number of recoveries (1.1% or less for all benchmarks) result in a second
crash. For these cases, we find checkpoints used for restoring program state contain
corrupted data. In our experiments, checkpoints are taken at the beginning of
main loop iterations. While recovery is triggered at program crashes–i.e., when
an exception or lockup is detected–a checkpoint may be taken after a fault occurs
but before it is exposed as a program crash, which causes the checkpoint to be
corrupted. In addition to crashes the second time around, some recoveries lead
to incorrect outcomes. Figure 4.3 shows that averaged over all three hardware
structures, about 18.7% and 1.1% of recoveries result in incorrect outcomes for the
multimedia and AI benchmarks, respectively. Although most of these incorrect
outcomes still exhibit good solution quality, this result indicates soft checkpointing
alone does not guarantee correct execution. In some cases, faults may corrupt some
unprotected soft state so that the solution quality is degraded sufficiently to make
the result unacceptable.
In addition to the problems of corrupted checkpoints and unacceptable solution
quality–the former can also appear in other checkpointing mechanisms, there exist
other limitations in applying soft checkpointing. First, only programs computing
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on soft data can benefit from such a mechanism. In our experiments, we mainly
study multimedia and AI workloads. We plan to study more application domains
in the future. Secondly, we find soft data do not tolerate errors equally. In other
words, some data may be extremely resilient to errors while some other data can
only allow a small deviation from exact execution. Such softness discrepancy affects
the effectiveness of soft checkpoint in recovery, and possibly makes it more complex
in determining what to checkpoint.
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Chapter 5
Fault Detection with Value Prediction
In previous chapters (Chapter 3 and Chapter 4), we have discussed our study
on program state redundancy at the application level. Our experimental results
show that programs–especially soft computations–can tolerate more errors if their
final state–their outputs–are interpreted from the user’s standpoint. We also imple-
ment a lightweight fault recovery technique by only checkpointing a small portion
of program state. In addition to our work on program state redundancy, we now ex-
plore another kind of redundancy which is also inherent to program execution–value
predictability. Value predictability is found to exist in instruction and data streams,
and has been widely studied to break true data dependence and improve program
ILP. In our work, we find it can also be exploited to improve program reliability,
more specifically, through low-cost fault detection.
In this chapter, we first introduce how we apply value prediction for fault de-
tection in Section 5.1. Here, we discuss our study on characterizing instructions’
vulnerability to faults as well as our methods in selecting instructions for fault pro-
tection. Then, Section 5.2 describes our experimental methodology, and reports both
the reliability and performance results. Next, Section 5.3 compares our technique
against fault screener [12], another technique that exploits the inherent redundancy
in programs to improve fault tolerance.
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5.1 Reducing Error Rate with Value Prediction
This section discusses in detail how value prediction is applied to reduce error
rate. First, Section 5.1.1 introduces the main value predictors that have been ex-
plored in the literature. Then, Section 5.1.2 discusses how we use value predictors to
check instruction results. Next, Section 5.1.3 briefly describes fault recovery. Lastly,
Section 5.1.4 quantifies instruction’s vulnerability to faults and proposes selectively
predicting instructions to mitigate performance loss.
5.1.1 Value Predictor Background
Value prediction has been widely studied to improve program performance
by breaking data dependence–instruction result is predicted and fed to dependent
instructions, which can then proceed speculatively, thus program ILP is enhanced.
To make a prediction, an instruction’s past results are recorded, and its next result
is predicted based on the recorded outcomes. So far, several hardware predictors
have been proposed for value prediction including last value prediction, stride pre-
diction, context prediction and hybrid prediction [35]. Each predictor differs in how
it encodes instruction’s past results and makes prediction accordingly.
Last Value Predictor Last value predictor works for instructions which produce
the same results for consecutive instances. It stores an instruction’s result produced
at the most recent time, and predicts the same value for the next time the same
instruction is encountered. Figure 5.1 shows the scheme of last value prediction.
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Figure 5.2: Diagram of Last Value Predictor.
outcomes, which are stored in the “Value” field of each entry. The other field in
each VHT entry, labeled “Tag”, is used to identify the instruction mapped to that
entry. During each prediction, the program counter (PC) of the instruction to be
predicted is used after a HASH function to select an appropriate VHT entry, then
the data stored in the entry’s “Value” field is adopted as the predicted value. After
the instruction has finished its computation, its newest result is used to update the
“Value” field of the corresponding VHT entry.
57
Stride Predictor Stride predictor captures the pattern of some instructions’ com-
putation that the results of their consecutive instances differ by a constant value.
Figure 5.2 shows the basic scheme of a stride predictor. Similar to last value predic-
tor, stride predictor also contains a VHT which contains instructions’ most recent
outcomes in field labeled “Value” as well a “Tag” field for instruction identification.
In addition, each VHT entry also contains a “Stride” field for storing the difference
between the stored outcome and its precedent, and a “State” for indicating the sta-
tus for making prediction with the stride. When a new instance of an instruction
is executed, the difference between the new value and the last-value field is written
into the “Stride” field, and the new value itself is written into the “Value” field. If
the same stride value is computed twice in a row, the corresponding “State” field
is marked as “steady”, and the predictor predicts the instruction’s next value as
the sum of the “Value” and “Stride” fields. When a computed stride differs from
the previously computed stride, its “State” field is marked as transient, and the
predictor stops making predictions until the stride repeats again.
Context-based Predictor Context predictor can capture more complex patterns
of instruction computation than last value predictor and stride predictor. Figure 5.2
illustrates the basic scheme of a context predictor. Different from last value predictor
and stride predictor, a context predictor consists of two tables–a VHT and a Pattern
History Table (PHT). For each instruction to predict, the VHT maintains the last
history-depth number of unique outcomes produced by the instruction in the “Value
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Figure 5.3: Diagram of Last Value Predictor.
(VHP)”, that encodes the pattern in which these outcomes occurred during the
last pattern-length dynamic instances of the instruction. During prediction, the
instruction’s VHP field is used to index the PHT. Each PHT entry contains several
frequency counters, one for each instruction outcome in the VHT. The counter with
the highest count indicates the most frequent successor value given the instruction’s
current value pattern. If the highest counter is above some threshold, then the
corresponding outcome in the “Value History” field is predicted for the instruction;
otherwise, no prediction is made. After an instruction has produced its actual
computation result, the corresponding PHT entry counter is incremented by an hit
bonus while the other counters in the same PHT entry are decremented by a miss
penalty. And the corresponding VHP field in the VHT is also updated to reflect the
instruction’s new outcome pattern.
Hybrid Predictor Hybrid predictor consists of two predictors, usually a stride
predictor and a context-based predictor. Prediction from the context predictor has
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more preference; if the context predictor cannot make a prediction, then the value
predicted–if any–by the stride predictor is selected. Hence, hybrid predictor can
perform better since it incorporates the abilities of both the stride and the context
predictor–it can predict instruction outputs that have not been seen, but conform
to a fixed stride pattern with outputs that have been produced; it can also predict
instruction outputs that have appeared, but conform to more complex patterns than
simply striding with other precedent output values.
5.1.2 Predictor-Based Fault Detection
To utilize value predictability for fault detection, instruction outputs are first
predicted and then compared with actual computational results. In contrast to
traditional applications of value prediction which require prediction results at the
early stages of the pipeline for breaking true data dependences, to compare with
computational results, prediction results are not needed until the writeback stage.
This relaxes the timing constraints for the prediction, enabling large and more so-
phisticated predictors for high prediction rate. Although aggressive predictors are
possible, we find simple predictors which incur low hardware overhead and low
power consumption can provide significant fault tolerance benefits. In our study, we
adopt a hybrid predictor which is composed of one stride predictor and one context
predictor. Prediction from the context predictor is selected first; if the context pre-
dictor cannot make a prediction, then the stride predictor is consulted to produce
a prediction.
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During each predictor comparison, the prediction and actual computation re-
sult will either match or differ. Each case has two possible interpretations. When
the results match, the first possibility is the predictor predicted the correct value.
In this case, no fault occurred since the instruction also produced the same correct
value. The second possibility is the predictor predicted the wrong value, but a fault
occurred such that the instruction produced the same wrong value. This case is
highly unlikely, especially under the assumption of Single-Event-Upset (SEU) fault
model in our study. Hence, if the prediction and actual computation result match,
we assume no fault has occurred, and thus, do not take additional action.
If the prediction and actual instruction result differ, the first possibility is the
predictor predicted the correct value. In this case, a fault has occurred since the
instruction produced a different value. The second possible interpretation is the
predictor predicted the wrong value, and the instruction either produced a correct
or wrong value (again, we assume a misprediction and incorrect result will never
match). Unfortunately, there is no way to tell which of these cases has occurred, so
we can only assume that there is the potential for a fault. In our study, we always
assume conservatively that a fault has occurred, and initiate recovery by squashing
the pipeline and re-executing the squashed instructions in the hopes of correcting the
fault. During re-execution, if the instruction produces the same result, then we know
with high probability that the original instruction did not incur a fault. If no fault
occurred (the most likely case), the pipeline flush was unnecessary, and performance
is degraded. (However, as we will see in Section 5.1.3, such “unnecessary” flushes
can actually improve reliability in many cases).
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To reduce the performance degradation caused by false positives, we use con-
fidence estimation to limit predictions to instructions that have high confidence. In
our experiments, we employ the confidence estimator described in [1]. We associate
a saturating counter with each entry in the value predictor table. A prediction is
made only when the corresponding saturating counter is equal to or above a certain
threshold. If the prediction turns out to be correct (the match case), the saturating
counter is incremented by some value. If the prediction turns out to be incorrect
(the mismatch case in which the original and re-executed results are the same),
the saturating counter is decremented by some value. Given confidence estimation,
since it is the confidence threshold that determines which instructions to predict ul-
timately, we can tradeoff the number of false positives with the number of predicted
instructions (and hence, the fault coverage) by varying the confidence threshold.
Section 5.2 will discuss how we select confidence thresholds.
In addition, we assume both the stride and context predictors used in our work
can always make predictions for the selected instructions by their writeback stage.
Such assumption is based on the small size of the predictors (see predictor param-
eters in Section 5.2.1)–our predictors are smaller or equal to the value predictors
adopted in other work [1, 35, 36], which have to make predictions by the issue stage
for the purpose of boosting performance. Hence there will be no timing-related
problems when integrating our predictors into existing CPU pipelines.
62
5.1.3 Fault Recovery
When an instruction’s prediction result differs from its computed value, it is
possible that some fault has occurred before or during the instruction’s execution.
To recover from the fault, it is necessary to roll back the computation prior to
the fault, and re-execute. For such purpose, checkpoint is usually used to restore
processor state, which unfortunately involves certain hardware or software support
as well as performance cost. In our work, we take a simpler approach and perform
roll back by flushing from the pipeline the potentially corrupted instructions. After
flushing, we re-fetch and re-execute from the flush point. (A similar mechanism for
branch misprediction recovery can be used for our technique).
Note our recovery mechanism is not perfect. It can only correct fault cor-
ruptions that occur on predicted instructions, or instructions that are downstream
from a mispredicted instruction (which would incur flush including the mispredicted
instruction, as well as all subsequent instructions). If a fault attacks a non-predicted
instruction that is not flushed by earlier mispredicted instructions, then even if the
fault propagates to an instruction to be predicted later on, recovery would not roll
back the computation early enough to re-execute all the faulty instructions. How-
ever, even with this limitation, we find our technique is still quite effective.
Because soft errors are rare, most recoveries are triggered by the mispredictions
of the value predictor. As mentioned in Section 5.1.2, such false positives can degrade
performance. However, they can also improve reliability. Often times, re-executed
instructions run faster than the original instructions that were flushed (the flushed
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instructions can prefetch data from memory or train the branch predictor on behalf
of the re-executed instructions). As a result, the re-executed instructions occupy the
instruction queues for a shorter amount of time, reducing their vulnerability to soft
errors compared to the original instructions. This effect is particularly pronounced
for instructions that stall for long periods of time due to cache misses. Hence, while
false positives due to mispredictions can degrade performance, this degradation often
provides a reliability benefit in return. The next section describes how we can best
exploit this tradeoff.
5.1.4 Analysis of Instruction Vulnerability
In order to reduce the chance of mispredictions and unnecessary squashes, we
not only apply confidence estimation (as described in Section 5.1.2), but also limit
value prediction to instructions that are most closely related to overall program
reliability–in other words, protecting those instruction can potentially benefit pro-
gram reliability the most. This section describes how we assess the reliability impact
of different instructions.
Recently, to reason about hardware reliability, many computer architects have
used Architectural Vulnerability Factor (AVF), which is proposed by Mukherjee et
al [18]. AVF captures the probability that a transient fault in a processor structure
will result in a visible error in program final outputs. It provides a quantitative way
to estimate the architectural effect of fault derating. To compute AVF, bits in a
structure are classified as being related to architecturally correct execution (ACE
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bits), or not (un-ACE bits). Only errors in ACE bits can possibly cause output
errors. A hardware structure’s AVF is on average the percentage of ACE bits that
occupy the hardware structure throughout program execution.
To identify ACE bits and compute AVF, instructions must first be distin-
guished as ACE or un-ACE. [18] proposed a conservative method–bits (instructions)
are ACE unless they can be proved otherwise. The authors identified 5 architectural
un-ACE sources including NOP instructions, performance-enhancing instructions
(e.g., prefetches), predicated-false instructions, dynamically dead code, and logical
masking.1 Among ACE instructions, we make the key observation that they are not
equal in affecting system vulnerability. Instead, each instruction’s residence time in
hardware structures determines its reliability contribution. As stated by Weaver, et
al. [37], the longer time an instruction spends in the pipeline, the more it is exposed
to sources of soft errors such as neutron and alpha strikes, and hence, the more sus-
ceptible it becomes to faults. To minimize the long residency of ACE instructions,
they proposed squashing instructions that incur long delays such as cache misses.
We extend this idea by quantifying fault vulnerability at the instruction level, and
selectively protecting the instructions that are more susceptible to faults.
To characterize fault vulnerability of each ACE instruction, we measure the
fraction of overall AVF it contributes. More specifically, for the hardware structures
1Although bits for ACE instructions are not necessarily ACE themselves, (e.g., logical masking
may cause some bits of ACE instructions to be un-ACE), we find it is quite related between
the statistics of ACE instructions and AVF estimation. In our study, we use the change in the




































































































Figure 5.4: Accumulative Percentage of AVF and Instruction Count in Fetch Buffer
on TWOLF.
in our study–e.g., fetch buffer and issue queue, we first collect the residence time
of each ACE instruction. Next, we sort instructions by their residence time, and
compute their corresponding contribution to the structure’s total AVF. Then, we
plot the cumulative percentage of ACE instructions as well as their cumulative AVF
percentage.
Our study shows that a very small number of instructions account for a ma-
jority of the AVF in hardware structures. Figure 5.4 illustrates the distribution
of ACE instructions in fetch buffer for benchmark TWOLF from SPEC2000 suite.
In Figure 5.4, the X-axis represents the accumulated fraction of total instructions.
Each point along the X-axis stands for a group of instructions which have the same
residence time in fetch buffer; groups of instructions with longer residence time are
displayed first. The Y-axis in the graph represents the corresponding accumulated
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percentage of AVF or dynamic instructions–the top curve represents AVF while the
bottom curve represents instruction count. From the graph we can see at the begin-
ning (leftside of the graph), both the instruction count and their AVF portions are
almost zero, indicating that there are few instructions with extremely long residence
time. Then, as instructions with shorter latency are counted in, their AVF portion
also gets bigger, while the latter increases much faster till the first marked point
(on the left of the graph). The marked points (the two points each on the left side
of its curve) show that about 3.5% of instructions corresponds to about 53.9% of
average AVF for the hardware structure. Afterwards, the increase in AVF portion
turns much slower as the number of instructions increases. Therefore, a small set of
instructions–3.5% in the example–consists of a large AVF fraction. Those instruc-
tions are much more susceptible to faults than the remaining ones –illustrated by
the marked points on the right side of the curves, the majority of instructions (about
91.8%) exhibit a latency smaller than 40 cycles, and account for a relatively small
portion of the overall AVF (about 28.4%). We find similar behavior occurs for the
other benchmarks as well as for the other hardware structures. Such results show
that using our value predictor to target a small number of instructions–those with
very large latencies–is sufficient to provide the majority of fault protection. (As
mentioned in Section 5.1.2, our technique performs checking at instruction’s write-
back stage. By then the instruction’s latency is known. Hence, it can be determined
on time whether to check its computation or not.) This is good news since it will
minimize the performance impact of mispredictions. In addition, it’s up to design-
ers to decide which portions of instructions are susceptible enough to be protected,
67
which provides desirable flexibility in system design.
In addition, our study also shows instructions exhibit different fault vulner-
ability at different hardware structures: while an instruction may stall for a long
time in one hardware structure, it may not stall for very long in other structures. In
other words, a single instruction can contribute differently to different structures’
vulnerability. Thus, an interesting question is how to select the smallest group of
instructions that will provide the largest benefit to the whole processor’s reliabil-
ity? In our work, we evaluate three different policies for determining instruction’s
vulnerability: the total residence time of an instruction from fetch to issue, from
dispatch to writeback, or from fetch to writeback. We will present our results in
Section 5.2.
5.2 Experimental Methodology and Results
In Section 5.1 we discussed our study on characterizing instruction vulnera-
bility. Our results show that a small set of instructions accounts for a big portion
of hardware vulnerability. We also qualitatively analyzed the impact of flushing
pipeline on value misprediction: flushing degrades performance, but in some cases
it may improve program reliability. We consider such tradeoffs in our design, and
use insights from both to drive value prediction and confidence estimation–the latter
ultimately determines which instructions will get predicted.
In this section, we present our experimental results of applying value prediction
to those highly vulnerable instructions for fault protection. Throughout our exper-
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iments, we have adopted two analysis techniques to estimate the reliability impacts
of our technique. The main method is AVF analysis, which has been discussed in
Section 5.1.4. The other method is fault injection, which has been traditionally–and
is still widely–used to evaluate system reliability. Compared to AVF computation,
the method of fault injection actually introduce faults into a hardware description
of a processor or radiation testing on a physical device, thus it makes it possible to
observe fault propagation and characterize fault coverage more accurately. However,
its nature of statistical sampling requires large amount of trials, which can cause
enormous experimental time and resources to be consumed. Contrastingly, although
AVF analysis can only provide a lower bound on the reliability of a processor design,
it performs much faster–it utilizes high-level performance model coupled with low-
level design information, and only needs one simulation run to obtain the reliability
estimate of the design. Since both analysis techniques have their own advantages
and disadvantages, we mainly employ AVF analysis to evaluate the reliability impact
of our technique (Section 5.2.2, Section 5.2.3, and Section 5.2.4). We also conduct
another group of experiments with fault injection (Section 5.2.5), and compare the
results from AVF computation and fault injection experiments(Section 5.2.6).
In more detail, Section 5.2.1 first introduces the processor model and the
benchmarks we use in our experiments. Then, in Section 5.2.2, we investigate the
potential of using value prediction to check the computations of highly vulnerable
instructions. We compare our approach with predicting all the result-producing
instructions. As we have discussed, with value prediction technique, we exploit pro-
gram’s inherent redundancy for result comparison and fault detection. In addition,
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Hybrid Value Predictor Parameters
VHT size / values per VHT entry 1024 / 4
PHT size / PHT counter threshold 1024 / 3
Confidence Estimator Parameters
saturation threshold 15
low / mid / high threshold 3 / 7 / 15
miss penalty / increment bonus 7 / 1
Table 5.1: Parameter settings for the detailed architectural model into which we
inject faults.
by identifying and protecting the most vulnerable instructions, we can potentially
limit performance degradation while maintaining comparable reliability gain. Next,
in Section 5.2.3, we incorporate the finding of various vulnerability across differ-
ent instructions, and propose adaptive threshold in confidence estimation. In Sec-
tion 5.2.4, we also discuss different policies for computing instruction latency, which
is used in selection for value prediction. At last, in Section 5.2.5, we employ fault
injection for another group of selective value prediction experiments. Section 5.2.6
presents the comparison between fault injection and AVF computation.
5.2.1 Simulator and Benchmarks
In our experiments, on top of the baseline detailed architectural simulator
shown in Table 3.1, we implement a hybrid value predictor including one stride
predictor and one context predictor–as described in [35]. We also implement a
confidence estimator as described in [1]. Both the value predictor and confidence
estimator are configured as specified by Table 5.1.
In addition, Table 5.2 lists all the benchmarks used in our experiments. These
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Table 5.2: Benchmarks and input datasets used in our experiments.
benchmarks come from the SPEC2000 Integer suite. In the table, the column la-
beled “Input” specifies the input dataset used for each benchmark, and the column
labeled “Instruction Count” reports the number of instructions executed by each
benchmark–we start simulation after program initialization, so “Instruction Count”
does not include the benchmarks’ initialization part.
5.2.2 Value Prediction Experiments
We first present our experiments on applying value prediction without confi-
dence estimation to fault detection. We evaluate the impacts on both reliability and
performance when predicting all or a portion of result-producing instructions, which
we call full or selective prediction, respectively. Full prediction predicts an instruc-
tion as long as the predictor can make a prediction (as described in Section 5.1.1,
the predictors are unable to make predictions in some cases). Selective prediction
only predicts instructions that meet some minimum latency threshold–we measure
instruction’s latency from the fetch stage to the issue stage.























































Figure 5.5: Average distribution of result-producing instruction count, as well as
their prediction and misprediction rate, across different latency range over all the 9
spec2000 integer benchmarks. Latency is measured from fetch to issue stage.
total number of executed instructions) across all instructions (labeled “total”) and
for different latency ranges, as well as the fraction of instructions from each category
(“total” and the different latency ranges) that are correctly predicted and mispre-
dicted. Every datapoint in Figure 5.5 represents an average across all the bench-
marks listed in Table 5.2. In the graph, the X-axis represents instruction latency
range, marked as increasing latency while the leftmost stands for the complete set of
result-producing instructions; the Y-axis represents either percentage of instruction
count, or the percentage of correctly predicted or mispredicted instructions. From
the graph, we see in total result-producing instructions account for about 81.4% of all
instructions. In particular, instructions with shorter latency–i.e., latency less than


























































Figure 5.6: Average AVF of 2 hardware structures and IPC (relative to original
execution) across 9 spec2000 integer benchmarks by applying value prediction to
long-latency instructions. Latency is measured from fetch to issue stage. On value
misprediction, mispredicted instructions and all subsequent ones are flushed and
then re-fetch and re-execute.
41.4% of result-producing instructions. Moreover, these short-latency instructions
exhibit relatively good prediction rates–63.7% on average. In contrast, instructions
with longer latency (than 5 cycles) have slightly lower prediction rate–around 40%
to 50%. However, given the importance of these long-latency instructions to system
reliability, it is still worth to check their values through prediction.
We now measure the impact of value prediction on both program reliability and
performance. As we have discussed in Section 5.1.2, on each value misprediction,
the mispredicted instruction and all subsequent instructions are flushed from the
pipeline, and the program starts to re-fetch and re-execute from the flushed point.
Figure 5.6 reports the average IPC and AVF of fetch buffer and issue queue, config-
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ured as Table 3.1–by full or selective prediction. Each datapoint in the graph repre-
sents the average across all the benchmarks; the X-axis represents latency threshold
used for selective value prediction–only instructions that stay in the pipeline (mea-
sured from fetch to issue stage) longer than or equal to the corresponding threshold
are selected for value prediction; the Y-axis represents the AVF or IPC normalized
to the baseline values without prediction. The leftmost points in the graph (marked
as “pred all” on the X-axis) represent results from full prediction.
Figure 5.6 shows prediction-based fault protection can be very effective at
improving reliability (i.e., reducing AVF). The AVF for the fetch queue and issue
queue is reduced by as much as 96.0% and 89.8%, respectively (under full prediction)
compared to no prediction. This is due to both correct and incorrect predictions.
On a correct prediction, the value of the predicted instruction is checked, so the in-
struction is no longer vulnerable, and hence, does not contribute to the AVF of the
structures it occupies. On a misprediction, the pipeline is flushed. As discussed in
Section 5.1.2, re-execution after flushing is typically faster than the original execu-
tion, thus reducing the occupancy of ACE instructions in the hardware structures.
Both combine to provide the AVF improvements shown in Figure 5.6.
Unfortunately, these reliability improvements come at the expense of perfor-
mance. Figure 5.6 shows IPC can degrade significantly due to the penalty incurred
by mispredictions, particularly when a large number of instructions are predicted.
Under full prediction, IPC reduces by 55.1% compared to no prediction. But the
performance impact lessens as fewer instructions are predicted (moving towards the
right side of Figure 5.6). For example, when predicting instructions with latency
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greater than or equal to 5 cycles, the performance impact is less than 29.4%. Al-
though reliability improvement is not as great when predicting fewer instructions, it
can still be significant–we achieve a 84.0% and 56.5% reduction in AVF for the fetch
buffer and issue queue respectively at threshold latency of 5 cycles. Furthermore,
when predicting even fewer instructions, although both the performance and relia-
bility impacts become smaller, they do not reduce at the same pace. For example,
when predicting instructions with latency greater than or equal to 30 cycles, the
performance impact is less than 3.8%, while the AVF reduction for the fetch buffer
and issue queue can still achieve up to 74.9% and 39.2%, respectively.
In general, Figure 5.6 indicates there exists a tradeoff between reliability and
performance. The more instructions we predict, the larger the improvement in
reliability, but also the larger the degradation in performance. However, when we
focus the value predictor on long-latency instructions such as instructions with ≥
30-cycle latency, the performance loss is small while the reliability gain is still quite
large. This is because the longer the instruction latency, the smaller the impact
mispredictions will have on performance. Furthermore, the longer the instruction
latency, the more critical the instructions are from a reliability standpoint.
5.2.3 Confidence Estimation
As value misprediction causes pipeline squash which degrades program per-
formance, we integrate a separate confidence estimator with the value predictor to



















































Figure 5.7: Average distribution of value prediction rate–with confidence
estimation–across different latency range over all the 9 spec2000 integer benchmarks.
Latency is measured from fetch to issue stage.
diction rates of our value predictor with confidence estimation for all instructions,
labeled “total”, and for instructions with different latency ranges (The graph is pre-
sented in the same way as Figure 5.5). The confidence estimator is configured as
Table 5.1. Compared with Figure 5.5, which has no confidence estimation applied,
Figure 5.7 shows our value predictor achieves fewer correct predictions–the reduction
ranges between 10% and 15%. This is because the confidence estimator prevents
predicting the less predictable instructions. As a result, the misprediction rate goes
down to almost 0 across all latency ranges. As Figure 5.7 shows, our confidence
estimator is quite effective at reducing mispredictions with only a modest dip in the
number of correct predictions.


























































Figure 5.8: Average AVF of 2 hardware structures and IPC (relative to original ex-
ecution) across 9 spec2000 integer benchmarks by applying value prediction to long-
latency instructions. Value predictor is complemented with a separate confidence
estimator. Latency is measured from fetch to issue stage. On value misprediction,
mispredicted instructions and all subsequent ones are flushed and then re-fetch and
re-execute.
hardware structures, as well as on IPC (the graph uses exactly the same format as
Figure 5.6). In Figure 5.8, we see IPC never degrades more than 4%, even when
performing full prediction. These results show confidence estimation is indeed ef-
fective at mitigating performance degradation. Unfortunately, applying confidence
estimation also brings down the reliability improvement. In particular, under full
prediction, the AVF for the fetch buffer and issue queue is now reduced by at
most 49.3% and 29.0%, respectively; under selective prediction, the AVF for the
fetch buffer and issue queue is reduced by about 43.1% and 23.4% for prediction
with baseline latency of 5 cycles, and 23.6% and 10.3% for prediction with base-
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line latency of 30 cycles, respectively. Such lower reliability improvements are still
exposed after taking performance loss into account. In all, by comparing reliabil-
ity and performance impacts between with confidence estimation (Figure 5.8) and
without confidence estimation (Figure 5.6), we see confidence estimation is helpful
in lessening performance loss due to mispredictions, but it also degrades reliability
improvement since it suppresses prediction of many instructions, thus reduces the
coverage achieved by the value predictor.
Thus far, we have applied confidence estimation uniformly across all eligible
instructions–i.e., we use a single confidence threshold to determine whether a par-
ticular instruction should be predicted or not. However, predicting all instructions
using a uniform confidence level may not be the best policy since instructions do
not contribute equally to program reliability. In particular, for longer latency in-
structions which are more susceptible to faults and thus contribute more to overall
reliability–they usually also incur less performance degradation during misprediction
recovery, it may be better to perform value prediction more aggressively. Conversely,
for shorter latency instructions which contribute less to overall reliability–they usu-
ally incur more performance degradation during recovery compared to instructions
with longer latencies, it may be better to perform value prediction less aggressively.
This suggests an adaptive confidence estimation technique has the potential to more
effectively tradeoff reliability and performance.
In our study, we modify our confidence estimation scheme to adapt the confi-
dence threshold based on each instruction’s latency. In particular, we employ three
different threshold levels, similar to what is proposed in [1]. (The thresholds for low,
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medium, and high confidence are 3, 7, and 15, respectively for a saturating value of
15). Instructions which latencies falls in certain ranges are assigned corresponding
confidence thresholds: we use the lowest confidence threshold for instructions that
incur a latency equal to or larger than 4 times the baseline latency; we use the
medium confidence threshold for instructions that incur a latency equal to or larger
than 2 times the baseline latency but smaller than 4 times the baseline latency; and
we use the highest confidence threshold for instructions that incur a latency equal
to or larger than the baseline latency but smaller than 2 times the baseline latency.
Here, the baseline latency is the minimum instruction latency that is considered for
prediction as given by latency-based selective prediction. (For example, if we only
predict instructions with latency 5 cycles or larger, then the low, medium, and high
thresholds are applied to instructions with latency in the ranges ≥ 20 cycles, 10-19
cycles, and 5-9 cycles, respectively).
We measure both reliability and performance impacts of combining latency-
based selective prediction with adaptive confidence estimation as described. Fig-
ure 5.9 reports the new AVF of our three hardware structures, as well as IPC,
averaged across all the benchmarks. The graph is plotted in the same format as
Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.8, except that now, each latency marked along the X-axis in
the graph represents the smallest (baseline) latency threshold–only instructions that
stay longer than the baseline latency are eligible for prediction, which is also associ-
ated with the highest confidence threshold; the corresponding medium and largest
latency thresholds are by default two or four times of the baseline latency, and


























































Figure 5.9: Average AVF of 2 hardware structures and IPC (relative to original
execution) across 9 spec2000 integer benchmarks by applying value prediction to
long-latency instructions. Latency is measured from fetch to issue stage. Confidence
threshold used for each prediction varies (high, medium or low threshold) according
to the instruction’s latency. On value misprediction, mispredicted instructions and
all subsequent ones are flushed and then re-fetch and re-execute.
instructions whose saturating counters meet the corresponding confidence thresh-
old are predicted. Comparing with the baseline confidence estimation technique
shown in Figure 5.8, Figure 5.9 shows that similarly, adaptive confidence estima-
tion incurs a relatively small performance degradation. For example, under selective
prediction, the performance degradation is about 9.4% for prediction with 5-cycle
baseline latency, and 2.4% for prediction with 15-cycle baseline latency. However,
adaptive confidence estimation achieves a much better reliability improvement (AVF
reduction) than the baseline confidence estimation, and approaches the reliability








































Figure 5.10: Average IPC and AVF of 2 hardware structures across 9 spec2000
integer benchmarks by varying threshold of confidence estimation according to in-
struction latency. Each set of values marked along X-axis contains three latency
thresholds, listed as lowest, medium, and highest threshold, and associated with
three confidence thresholds, respectively– the three confidence thresholds are se-
lected as described in [1].
Figure 5.6. For example, under selective prediction, the AVF for the fetch buffer
and issue queue is reduced by 79.6% and 50.9% for prediction with baseline latency
of 5 cycles, and 69.8% and 33.6% for prediction with baseline latency of 15 cycles,
respectively. Thus, by more aggressively predicting only the longer latency instruc-
tions, adaptive confidence estimation can cover the most critical instructions for
reliability without sacrificing too much on performance.
In addition to our 3-level confidence-threshold policy, we have also tried other
combinations of instruction latencies with confidence thresholds, which impacts on
reliability are exhibited in Figure 5.10. In Figure 5.10, the X-axis represents 5 sets of
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instruction latency threshold, while each set contains three latency thresholds, listed
as lowest, medium, and highest latency threshold. The three latency thresholds in
each set are associated with the three confidence thresholds as described above. The
association between latency and confidence threshold is: instructions which latencies
are equal to or longer than the highest latency threshold are assigned with the
lowest confidence threshold; instructions which latencies are shorter than the highest
latency threshold, but equal to or longer than the medium latency threshold are
assigned with the medium confidence threshold; while instructions which latencies
are shorter than the medium latency threshold, but equal to or longer than the lowest
latency threshold are assigned with the highest confidence threshold. Note the two
leftmost sets of latency threshold in the graph–(3, 5, 10) and (3, 20, 300)–belong to
full prediction since in our processor model, the smallest latency for an instruction
from fetch to issue in our processor model is 3 cycles. The other three sets of latency
threshold along the X-axis are for selective prediction. In particular, the middle set,
(5, 10, 20), satisfies our 3-level confidence-threshold policy as described before. In
addition, the Y-axis in Figure 5.10 stands for either IPC or AVF on one hardware
structure; each point in the graph stands for the average over experiments on all
the benchmarks in our study. Figure 5.10 indicates that full prediction (such as the
leftmost points in the graph) with varying confidence threshold has less advantage
on reliability gain when considering performance (IPC); on the contrary, selective
prediction–such as the datapoints in the middle of the graph with latency range (5,
10, 20)–results in less IPC reduction with good AVF gain. We adopt the set of (5,
10, 20) as the latency thresholds for the experiments in Section 5.3.
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5.2.4 Policy on Measuring Instruction Latency for Value Prediction
In the experiments presented so far, we measure each instruction’s residence
time from fetch to issue stage to determine its criticality for program’s fault vulnera-
bility. This can be implemented with a unified tag to keep the total processing time
of an instruction including fetch, dispatch, and issue. However, as value prediction
occurs at the end of execution stage (or the start of writeback), there exist other
choices for such criticality measurement. In our study, we compare three policies–
calculating instruction’s latency from fetch to issue, from dispatch to writeback, or
from fetch to writeback–for the resulting reliability and performance impacts.
We report reliability and performance impacts of using the three kinds of
processing time on our hardware structures: we use Figure 5.11 to show the new
AVF results and Figure 5.12 to show the new IPC results. In both graphs, policy
1 stands for latency computed from fetch to issue stage, policy 2 is for latency
from dispatch to writeback, and policy 3 is for latency from fetch to writeback
stage. The X-axis in the two graphs represents the same meaning as in Figure 5.6,
Figure 5.8, or Figure 5.9. From the graphs we can see, generally, there is no big
difference on issue queue among using different policy for computing instruction
latency, while for fetch buffer, incorporating fetch time–i.e., from fetch to issue or
fetch to writeback stage–ends up with more reliability gain than using dispatch to
writeback time. Such results are reasonable since fetch time directly indicates an
instruction’s vulnerability at fetch buffer, while it is counted in policy 1 and 3 but




























































Figure 5.11: Average AVF comparison of 3 policies for computing instruction
latency–instructions are selected by their latency for value prediction and confidence
estimation–on fetch buffer and issue queue (relative to original execution) across 9
spec2000 integer benchmarks. Policy 1 stands for latency computation from fetch
to issue stage, policy 2 is for latency from dispatch to writeback, and policy 3 is for
latency from fetch to writeback stage. The confidence threshold varies with instruc-
tion latency. On value misprediction, mispredicted instructions and all subsequent
ones are flushed and then re-fetch and re-execute.
issue stage–in Section 5.3.
5.2.5 Selective Value Prediction Experiments with Fault Injection
Thus far, we have investigated the reliability impact of our technique through
AVF analysis. As we have discussed, through AVF analysis, we can estimate the
system reliability very quickly–only one simulation round is needed. However, AVF
analysis is conservative and it can only provide a lower bound on the reliability

























































Figure 5.12: Average IPC comparison of 3 policies for computing instruction
latency–instructions are selected by their latency for value prediction and confidence
estimation–on fetch buffer and issue queue (relative to original execution) across 9
spec2000 integer benchmarks. Policy 1 stands for latency computation from fetch
to issue stage, policy 2 is for latency from dispatch to writeback, and policy 3 is for
latency from fetch to writeback stage. The confidence threshold varies with instruc-
tion latency. On value misprediction, mispredicted instructions and all subsequent
ones are flushed and then re-fetch and re-execute.
AVF analysis is typically conducted on a high-level performance timing model, thus
lacks for enough detail of the system design. Second, a system’s AVF is computed
by first identifying un-ACE bits as many as possible and then assuming all the
remaining bits are ACE. Thus, un-ACE bits that are not identified are all counted
as ACE, which causes the computed AVF result to be bigger than its actual value.
In addition, in analyzing the reliability impact of our technique, we count predicted
instructions as un-ACE (in addition to the un-ACE bits identified in [18]). This
is conservative because with value prediction, not only instructions that can be
correctly predicted are covered from faults, but also instructions that feed values
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to them may also have executed normally. For example, as we have mentioned,
for arithmetic instructions, their input data has to be unique if all other inputs
and outputs have certain values (correct prediction). Thus, instructions that have
produced the corresponding input values may also have executed properly, which
means the state bits that have contributed to the related computation of those
instructions are un-ACE, too. Omitting those un-ACE bits results in higher AVF
than the actual vulnerability of the system design.
To verify and compare with the AVF results, we conduct another group of
experiments through fault injection. The fault injection experiments are performed
on the same detailed architectural simulator that models a modern out-of-order
superscalar as described in Section 5.2.1. The simulator settings are also the same
as listed in Table 3.1. We set our value predictor so that it selectively predicts
instructions that stay equal to or more than 5 cycles in pipeline from fetch to
issue stage. As for confidence estimation, we adopt the set of latency threshold
(5, 10, 20) to associate with the highest, medium, and lowest confidence threshold,
separately (related analysis is discussed in Section 5.2.3). Since we choose the same
configuration for both the simulator and the value predictor, the performance impact
is the same as reported in Figure 5.9–i.e., the average IPC across all the benchmarks
listed in Table 5.2 is degraded by 9.4% relative to excution without value prediction.
To estimate the reliability impact, we inject faults into three hardware struc-
tures: the physical register file, the fetch queue, and the issue queue (IQ). Similar to
our previous work, we assume faults injected into a physical register will appear in
architectural state unless the register is idle or belongs to a mispeculated instruction.
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Benchmark Exec Time Inter Time Injects Regfile Fetch Issue
300.twolf 138292502 50000.0 2782 905 (0.32) 709 (0.25) 411 (0.15)
176.gcc 169540504 50000.0 3367 149 (0.05) 2327 (0.32) 210 (0.06)
254.gap 248111790 50000.0 8491 1391 (0.28) 652 (0.13) 480 (0.10)
164.gzip 93443879 50000.0 1899 441 (0.24) 279 (0.15) 284 (0.15)
256.bzip2 732651712 250000.0 2941 1132 (0.38) 1650 (0.56) 773 (0.26)
253.perlbmk 635694346 250000.0 2466 1272 (0.49) 782 (0.32) 393 (0.16)
197.parser 1065840259 250000.0 4301 1060 (0.25) 811 (0.19) 750 (0.18)
181.mcf 3733522703 250000.0 14877 4366 (0.29) 10363 (0.70) 5229 (0.35)
175.vpr 807673917 250000.0 3248 1016 (0.31) 202 (0.06) 388 (0.12)
Table 5.3: Detailed fault injection statistics for benchmarks used in our study. “Exec
Time” reports the execution time in cycles for each benchmark without value pre-
diction(original run). “Inter Time” reports the average time (cycles) between fault
injections. “Injects” reports for original run, the total number of faults injected into
the physical register file. The last 3 columns report the number of faults that fall on
non-speculative instructions or related resources for the physical register file, fetch
queue, and issue queue, respectively.
For the fetch queue, we allow faults to corrupt instruction bits (including opcodes,
register addresses, and immediate specifiers) and instruction address (PC). Faults
on PC for branch instruction may corrupt its computation. These faults manifest
in architectural state as long as the injected instruction is not mispeculated. Lastly,
for the IQ, we model 6 fields per entry: instruction opcode, 3 register tags (2 source
and 1 destination), an immediate specifier, and a PC value. Like the fetch queue,
faults in the IQ appear in architectural state for instructions that are not mispecu-
lated. Corruptions to the IQ opcode and immediate fields behave similarly to those
in the fetch queue. Corruptions to the register tags alter instruction dependences,
and corruptions to the PC value affect branch target addresses.
We perform fault injections across all the 9 SPEC2000 integer benchmarks
in our study, then compare reliability results of their original runs with those im-
plemented with value predictor. Table 5.3 presents fault injection information for
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the base-case runs of each benchmark. First, the column labeled “Exec Time” re-
ports for each benchmark’s base case, their measured execution time in cycles for
running a number of instructions (listed in Table 5.2) on our detailed out-of-order
simulator. In our experiments, we inject faults only after program initialization, so
“Exec Time” does not include the benchmarks’ initialization phase. After program
initialization, we perform fault injections on a single hardware structure. We per-
form 3 such injection runs on each benchmark to inject faults into the 3 hardware
structures (physical register file, fetch queue, and issue queue). During each run,
faults are randomly injected into a hardware structure one after another using a
uniformly distributed inter-fault arrival time. The column labeled “Inter Time” in
Table 5.3 reports the inter-fault arrival time (in cycles) used for each benchmark,
while the column labeled “Injects” reports the total number of injected faults for
the physical register file. (The number of injected faults for the other two hardware
structures is almost identical since they use the same inter-fault arrival time). For
program execution implemented with value prediction, their execution time varies
from executing the same instructions in their original runs due to flushes on mis-
prediction, which also causes different number of faults to be injected since we keep
the same inter-fault time for each benchmark.
Among all the faults injected, faults that attack idle hardware resources or
hardware occupied by mispeculated instructions have no impact on program execution–
they have been masked by the microarchitecture. We ignore these faults and only
simulate the remaining ones that somehow disrupt program control or data flow











































































































non-effective fatal flushed undetected
AVERAGE
Figure 5.13: Breakdown of fault injections on fetch buffer by applying our selec-
tive value prediction technique. The minimum latency threshold for prediction is
5 cycles, measured from fetch to issue stage. Confidence threshold used for each
prediction varies (high, medium or low threshold) according to the instruction’s la-
tency. On value misprediction, all the instructions in the pipeline are flushed and
then re-fetch and re-execute. Categories include faults that have no architectural
impact (“non-effective”), faults that cause program to crash or deadlock (‘fatal”),
faults that are removed during pipeline flushes before faulty instructions commit
(“flushed”), and faults that are not detected by value predictor before faulty in-
structions commit (“undetected”).
rupted instructions commit (for fault injection on physical register, we also check if
the latest instruction which updates the register value has committed). We define
the latter condition as “failure”. Such definition excludes fault masking effects from
software itself, which usually requires tracking until the end of program execution.
Instead, we focuses on faults’ architectural impact which examines the sensitivity of
value predictor to faults.
Figure 5.13 breakdowns all the fault injections on fetch buffer by their effects
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on program execution. In Figure 5.13, each group of bars represents experiments
on one benchmark, while the last group represents the average across all the bench-
marks. In each group, the bar labeled “original” represents the original execution,
while the bar labeled “dpred-sel5” represents the execution implemented with our
selective value prediction technique. Each bar contains four categories. The first
category, labeled “non-effective”, represents the portion of faults which cause no
architectural change compared to fault-free execution. For example, faults fall on
entry bits that are idle or contain speculative instructions, or the instructions are
non-speculative but the bits do not affect the computation, hence the faults are also
masked. The second category is labeled “fatal” and includes faults that cause pro-
gram to crash or deadlock. Then, the category labeled “flushed” represents faults
that are removed during pipeline flushes before faulty instructions commit. Lastly,
the category labeled “undetected” corresponds to faults that are not detected by
value predictor before faulty instructions commit. From the graph, we see the cat-
egory of “non-effective” consists of the majority of the fault injections–for original
program execution, on average about 77.0% of all the faults have no effect on pro-
gram execution, while for program execution with value prediction, about 92.2% of
all the faults have no effect. The higher rate of “non-effective” category is mainly
due to fault recovery in the value prediction technique–flushing the pipeline causes
more bits in the hardware to sit idle which therefore appear invulnerable to faults. In
addition to the faults that do not affect program execution, about 3.6% and 1.5% of
all the faults for program execution with and without value prediction, respectively











































































































non-effective fatal flushed undetected
AVERAGE
Figure 5.14: Breakdown of fault injections on issue queue by applying our selec-
tive value prediction technique. The minimum latency threshold for prediction is
5 cycles, measured from fetch to issue stage. Confidence threshold used for each
prediction varies (high, medium or low threshold) according to the instruction’s la-
tency. On value misprediction, all the instructions in the pipeline are flushed and
then re-fetch and re-execute. Categories include faults that have no architectural
impact (“non-effective”), faults that cause program to crash or deadlock (‘fatal”),
faults that are removed during pipeline flushes before faulty instructions commit
(“flushed”), and faults that are not detected by value predictor before faulty in-
structions commit (“undetected”).
faults can be detected by the system automatically. The remaining faults, about
19.3% for original program execution corrupt the computation of some instructions
which still manage to commit. Contrastingly, our value prediction technique suc-
cessfully detects and removes 2.9% of all the faults, resulting in 3.3% of the faults
to propagate outside the pipeline.
Figure 5.14 and Figure 5.15 show for issue queue and physical register file,











































































































non-effective fatal flushed committed, can't recover undetected
AVERAGE
Figure 5.15: Breakdown of fault injections on physical register file by applying our
selective value prediction technique. The minimum latency threshold for prediction
is 5 cycles, measured from fetch to issue stage. Confidence threshold used for each
prediction varies (high, medium or low threshold) according to the instruction’s la-
tency. On value misprediction, all the instructions in the pipeline are flushed and
then re-fetch and re-execute. Categories include faults that have no architectural
impact (“non-effective”), faults that cause program to crash or deadlock (‘fatal”),
faults that are removed during pipeline flushes before faulty instructions commit
(“flushed”), faults that occur on registers while the most recent instructions updat-
ing the registers have committed (“committed, can’t recover”), and faults that are
not detected by value predictor before faulty instructions commit (“undetected”).
the graphs are formatted similar to Figure 5.13, except that for physical register
file, when faults occur on one register, it is possible the latest instruction which
updates the corrupted register has committed, thus recovery–i.e., flushing pipeline
in our experiments–will not be able to restore processor state, thus we categorize
such cases as “committed, can’t recover”. Comparing with the average results on
fetch buffer which is shown in Figure 5.13, looking at program execution without
value prediction, for issue queue and physical register file, respectively, on average
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about 89.3% and 78.2% of all the faults occur on bits that have no impact on
program execution, and about 2.8% and 0.2% of all the faults cause program crash
or deadlock before the corrupted instructions commit, resulting in about 7.9% and
7.1% of the fault corruptions to propagate outside the pipeline (the “undetected”
categorty)–about 14.5% of the fault corruptions on physical register file belong to
“committed, can’t recover” category. Once value prediction is enabled, about 2.9%
and 2.4% of all the faults for issue queue and physical register file, respectively are
now cleared off the pipeline by our technique (the “flushed” category), resulting in
the portion of committed faults (labeled as “undetected”) to be reduced to 3.7% for
both issue queue and physical register file.
Figure 5.16 shows the overall MTTF which reflects the portion of faults that
have impacted some instructions’ computation while the corrupted instructions have
still committed. In Figure 5.16, results on each hardware structure are reported
separately. For each hardware structure, there are two groups of bars, representing
original program run and program runs with value prediction. The MTTF results
are reported as normalized to the original execution. From Figure 5.16, we see that
relative to original execution, our value prediction technique improves the average
MTTF across all the benchmarks to 6.23, 1.92 and 1.96 for fetch buffer, issue queue
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Figure 5.16: Average MTTF over 9 benchmarks in fetch buffer, issue queue and
physical register file by applying our selective value prediction technique. The mini-
mum latency threshold for prediction is 5 cycles, measured from fetch to issue stage.
Confidence threshold used for each prediction varies (high, medium or low threshold)
according to the instruction’s latency. On value misprediction, all the instructions
in the pipeline are flushed and then re-fetch and re-execute.
5.2.6 Discussion about Fault Injection and AVF Computation
As we have discussed, as two main methods in estimating system reliability.
either fault injection or AVF computation has its own advantages and disadvantages.
AVF computation is fast–it only requires one simulation run to obtain the reliability
estimation of a processor design, but its results are conservative and can only provide
a lower bound on the system reliability. Contrastingly, fault injection experiments
can actually track fault propagation, and thus, provide an accurate estimation of
the system reliability. However, it also requires a large number of samples, which










































































































































































































Figure 5.17: Fault coverage estimation for fetch buffer by fault injection experiments
and AVF computation.
results.
Wang et al [38] analyzed and compared both methods. In our study, we have
also employed both methods to estimate reliability impacts by ours or other fault
detection technique. It is interesting to compare their experimental results.
Figure 5.17 reports for each benchmark, the fault coverage on fetch buffer esti-
mated by fault injection experiments or AVF computation. To compute a hardware
structure’s fault coverage, given our fault injection results, we use the sum of the
portions of “non-effective”, “fatal” and “flushed” in Figure 5.13, Figure 5.14 and
Figure 5.15; with AVF computation, we refer a hardware structure is invulnerable–
covered from faults–at the probability of 1 minus AVF. In Figure 5.17, results on
each benchmark are represented with one group of bars, while the last group is










































































































































































































Figure 5.18: Fault coverage estimation for issue queue by fault injection experiments
and AVF computation.
and “AVF-orig” exhibit the fault coverage results on original program execution
by fault injection experiments and AVF computation, respectively, while the bars
labeled “FI-dpred” and “AVF-dpred” exhibit the results on program execution with
value prediction by fault injection or AVF computation. Figure 5.17 shows that
generally, fault coverage estimated by the fault injection experiments is higher than
AVF computation: on average, for original program execution and execution with
value prediction, fault injection estimates about 79.0% and 97.0%, while AVF com-
puation estimates about 76.6% and 96.9%, respectively. Hence, AVF computation is
2.4% and 0.2% more conservative than using fault injections for program execution
without and with value prediction, respectively.
Similarly, we report the fault coverage estimation on issue queue (Figure 5.18).
Figure 5.18 shows that AVF computation results in even more conservative fault
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coverage than fault injection experiments: on average, using fault injections results
in 92.0% and 96.2%, while AVF computation results in 75.2% and 90.7% of faults
to be covered for original program execution and execution with value prediction,
respectively. Hence, for issue queue, AVF computation is 16.8% and 5.5% more
conservative than fault injection campaign for program execution without and with
value prediction, respectively. The bigger difference of fault coverage results on issue
queue between fault injection and AVF computation is mainly due to the fact that
AVF computation is hard to analyze within one simulation pass for every bit in a
hardware entry, whether its corruption affects program execution or not; while the
method of fault injection actually introduces fault into processor state and tracks
fault propagation. Such disadvantage, exhibited as conservatism of estimated fault
coverage, is more exposed on issue queue than fetch buffer. For issue queue, its
entry contains more bits that are possible not to be used or affect instruction’s
computation–e.g., it has one separate 26-bit immediate specifier, while for fetch
buffer, the immediate data co-exists with other register tags.
5.3 Comparison with Fault Screening and Flush-on-L2-miss Tech-
niques
This section compares our technique with fault screening, as well as the tech-
nique of flushing on L2 misses to reduce soft-error rate. Fault screening is proposed
by Racunas et al [12], while flushing on L2 misses is proposed by Weaver et al [37].
To the best of our knowledge, fault screening is one of the most related work to
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our study in exploiting program’s inherent redundancy for fault tolerance. The
technique of flushing on L2 misses is similar to ours in that both explore the se-
lectivity on instruction vulnerability. In this section, Section 5.3.1 first summarizes
their techniques and discusses the main difference from ours. Then, Section 5.3.2
compares performance cost of the three techniques, and Section 5.3.3 compares re-
liability gain using fault injection experiments. Lastly, Section 5.3.4 analyzes the
sources of reliability gain.
5.3.1 Summary of Fault Screening and Flush-on-L2-miss Techniques
Racunas et al [12] proposed a technique called fault screening to detect value
perturbation and prevent possible faults. Their technique tries to identify valid
value space of an instruction’s output, which is done by recording its past values
as well as the value patterns. Future outputs that are not within the recorded
space are considered as potentially corrupted. Among various implementations pro-
posed in [12], the most practical one is called invariance-based screener. It works
by recording how the bit values of instruction results change throughout program
execution. Bits which keep the same values can be used to indicate future abnormal
events such as the occurring of soft errors. More specifically, in [12], the authors
keep track of bit invariance of memory instructions: a table with 1k bitmask entries
is created for store/load addresses, and another 512-entry table for data stored to
memory. Instruction address is used to index invariance table. Any change on the
bitmasks triggers pipeline flush to eliminate and recover from potential soft errors.
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The pipeline flush is achieved through branch recovery hardware. In addition, to
reduce the effect of destructive aliasing, the bitmask tables are reset regularly during
program execution.
It is very interesting to compare fault screener with our technique. The fault
screener “predicts” possible value space. It is easy to implement, and more impor-
tantly, the screener is able to make prediction on most instructions–usually for most
instructions, there always exist some bits that never change. However, its downside
comes from the same fact that on average it only predicts/protects a portion of bit
values, while unpredicted bits, which have changed values due to actual computa-
tion, are left for faults. On the contrary, our technique utilizes value prediction
to try to find out the exact values–including all the output bits–within the whole
data space. For an instruction output, all of its bits will be covered if the predictor
can make prediction–as a result, compared to fault screener, value prediction can
be more precise in capturing value discrepancy. Hence when detecting faults, if the
predicted value space by fault screener is much smaller than the whole data space,
it is very possible faults incur value perturbation and the screener catches them;
but value prediction technique can perform better than the screener if corrupted
values frequently fall outside the predicted space. Nevertheless, an advanced value
predictor usually involves more hardware, and its prediction rate can not compete
with bit-invariance screener either.
Weaver et al. [37] observed that the longer time an instruction spends in the
pipeline, the more it is exposed to sources of soft errors such as neutron and alpha
strikes, and hence, the more susceptible it becomes to faults. To reduce the time
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instructions sit in vulnerable storage structures, they proposed to selectively squash
instructions when long delays are encountered–more specifically, squash all the in-
structions following a load miss. Similar to their technique, our technique exploit
the fact that instructions are different on their contribution to system vulnerability–
we find a small portion of instructions account for a large fraction of system vul-
nerability. Furthermore, we quantify fault vulnerability at the instruction level,
and only apply value prediction to those instructions that are most susceptible to
faults–we evaluate an instruction’s vulnerability by its latency from fetch to issue
stage–and trigger recovery on mispredictions. Therefore, our technique covers more
long-latency instructions than load misses, and hence, better improves system reli-
ability with small additional performance degradation.
In addition, all the three techniques do not guarantee failure-free–it is hard for
them to detect or remove all possible faults. Even worse, both our technique and
fault screener may claim faults that do not exist (“false positive”): i.e., for value
prediction, every misprediction presents a false positive; for fault screening, every
natural bit-variation presents a false positive. For Weaver’s technique, it triggers
pipeline flush on L2 cachemiss no matter whether faults have actually occurred or
not. Thus, program performance is degraded when recovery is not necessary, which
is another important issue besides reliability impact. But as we have discussed pre-
viously, because we selectively predict instructions that have long residence time
in pipeline, re-execution during recovery on misprediction usually completes faster
than the original run, which leads to shorter exposure time of re-executed instruc-

























Figure 5.19: IPC (relative to original execution) on 9 spec2000 integer benchmarks
with either value prediction, bit-invariance screening, or flushing on L2 miss im-
plemented. On value or bit-invariance misprediction, the whole pipeline is flushed
and then re-fetch after a 3-cycle penalty. On L2 miss, all the instructions following
the load miss are squashed from the pipeline and they start to be re-fetch after the
cache miss is resolved.
results below also show the reliability benefits from recovery for both techniques.
5.3.2 Performance Impact
Before we evaluate how the three techniques detect and recover from faults,
we examine their impacts on program performance. We use the same detailed ar-
chitectural simulator described in Section 5.2. The simulator settings are also the
same as listed in Table 3.1. We set our value predictor so that it selectively predicts
instructions that stay equal to or more than 5 cycles in pipeline from fetch to issue
stage. As for confidence estimation, we adopt the set of latency threshold (5, 10,
20) to associate with the highest, medium, and lowest confidence threshold, sepa-
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rately (related analysis is discussed in Section 5.2.3). In addition, we implement
the bit-invariance screener as [12], using two tables to store value bitmasks, one for
store/load addresses, another for store data. Each bitmask table has 1K entries and
each entry is 32 bits long. The screener only makes predictions on store/load in-
structions. For better investigation, we also implement two other forms of screeners:
one has infinite table-entries and predicts not only store/load instructions, but also
other instructions that produce outputs; the other one has limited table size–1K
entries, and it predicts both memory instructions and all other result-computing
instructions. In our experiments, to be consistent with the configuration in [12], on
each value misprediction or change in invariance bits, the whole pipiline is flushed
and program starts to re-fetch and re-execute from the top of the flushed instruc-
tions. In the experiments, we assume a 3-cycle penalty from when a misprediction
is detected until the first re-fetched instruction can enter the pipeline. To imple-
ment the flush-on-L2-miss technique, we mark a load instruction if it incurs L2 miss
once executed; the flag of each load instruction is checked in each processor cycle–
checking starts from the oldest load in the pipeline–and if a flag set is detected, all
the subsequent instructions after the load instruction are flushed from the pipeline;
the flushed instructions will start to be re-fetched after the cachemiss is resolved.
Figure 5.19 reports for the benchmarks listed in Table 5.2, the average IPC of
their basic runs and those with value prediction, bit-invariance screening, or flushing
on L2 miss. In Figure 5.19, each group of bars represents experiments on one bench-
mark, while the last group represents the geometric mean across all the benchmarks.
In each group, the bar labeled “original” represents IPC of the original execution;
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the bar labeled “dpred-sel5” indicates the IPC of execution with value prediction;
the other 3 bars are for experiments with bit-invariance screeners: the bar labeled
“ipred-perfect” reports IPC of execution with infinite-table-size screener; the bar
labeled “ipred1K-all” reports IPC of execution with 1K-entry-table screener–again,
experiments on both “ipred-perfect” and “ipred1K-all” predict memory instructions
and all other result-computing instructions; the next bar labeled “ipred1K-mem” is
for execution with 1K-entry-table screener and only predicts memory instructions,
as implemented in [12]; at last, the bar labeled “flushL2” exhibits IPC of execution
which flushes the pipeline on L2 miss. All the results in each group of bars are nor-
malized by the corresponding IPC of original run (hence the bars labeled “original”
are always 1).
The results show that program execution with value prediction runs the slowest–
on average, our technique degrades program performance by about 12.6%, while
fault screening technique results in much less performance cost: screening with infi-
nite table has about 0.1%, screening with 1K-entry table and predicting all memory
and other output-computing instructions has about 1.7%, screening with 1K-table
and only predicting memory instructions has about 1.5% degradation. For execution
in which L2 misses trigger pipeline flushes, the performance is degraded by 7.4%.
The bigger performance degradation of our technique is mainly due to the larger
number of pipeline flushes caused by value mispredictions.
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5.3.3 Fault Injection Results
As for reliability evaluation, unfortunately, it is hard to compute AVF for
execution with bit-invariance screening. This is because the screener only covers a
portion of output bits, which cannot indicate the correctness status of other bits
in processor such as control bits. Hence in our study, we implement fault injection
experiments to capture the techniques’ capability on fault detection.
In addition, [12] used a functional simulator to inject faults–faults are ran-
domly injected to all instructions’ output bits, then those that are caught by the
screener are recorded. We claim functional simulator is too simple for accurate fault
injection experiment. For example, as we have discussed before, the longer an in-
struction stays in processor, the more chances it is exposed to faults. Functional
simulation does not incorporate such timing effect. Hence we conduct fault injection
experiments on the detailed architectural simulator as used in Section 5.3.2. Fur-
thermore, we follow the same fault injection methodology as in Section 5.2.5, and
study reliability impact on the three hardware structures: the physical register file,
the fetch queue, and IQ.
Similar to the fault injection experiments in Section 5.2.5, for all the injected
faults, if they corrupt valid processor state, we track their propagation until faulty
instructions have been flushed or commit, or program crashes. Figure 5.20 break-
downs all the faults on the three hardware structures–fetch buffer, IQ and physical
register file–by their effects on program execution. For each benchmark, we report









































































































non-effective fatal flushed committed, can't recover undetected
Figure 5.20: Breakdown of fault outcomes on fetch buffer, issue queue and physical
register file by applying value prediction, fault screening or flush-on-L2-miss tech-
niques. Categories include faults that have no architectural impact (“non-effective”),
faults that cause program to crash or deadlock (‘fatal”), faults that are removed dur-
ing pipeline flushes before faulty instructions commit (“flushed”), faults that occur
on physical register file but the latest instruction which updates the corrupted reg-
ister has committed (‘committed, can’t recover”), and faults that are not detected
by value predictor or bit-invariance screener before faulty instructions commit (“un-
detected”).
represented with a group of 6 bars, respectively: original program execution, pro-
gram execution with value prediction, program execution with fault screening that
has infinite table and predicts memory instructions as well as other instructions
producing outputs, program runs with fault screening that has 1K-entry table and
also predicts both memory and other result-computing instructions, program runs
with fault screening that has 1K-entry table and only predicts memory instructions,
and program execution with flush-on-L2-miss technique. Similar to Figure 5.15,
each bar contains five categories, labeled “non-effective”, “fatal”, “flushed”, “com-
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mitted, can’t recover” and “undetected”, respectively. Each category represents the
same class of fault injections as in Figure 5.15. From Figure 5.20, we see that fault
detection techniques successfully remove some number of faults from the pipeline:
for the three structures–fetch buffer, IQ and physical register file, value predic-
tion technique detects and removes 3.3%, 2.9% and 2.4%, respectively of all the
faults; fault screening with infinite table and predicting both memory and all other
result-producing instructions removes about 5.8%, 1.0% and 1.4%, respectively; fault
screening with 1K-entry table and predicting all memory and output-producing in-
structions removes about 5.4%, 1.2% and 1.2%, respectively; fault screening with
1K-entry table and only predicting memory instructions removes 4.2%, 1.2% and
0.7%; while flush-on-L2-miss technique removes about 0.2%, 0.1% and 0.1%, respec-
tively. As a result, in execution with fault detection techniques, less percentage of
faults can propagate out of the pipeline: for fetch buffer, IQ and physical register
file, the “undetected” portion is 19.3%, 7.9% and 7.0%, respectively for original
run; 2.9%, 3.7% and 3.7%, respectively for execution with value prediction; 13.4%,
6.9% and 5.6%, respectively for execution with fault screening which has infinite
table and predicts both memory and all other result-producing instructions; 13.2%,
6.8% and 5.9%, respectively for execution with fault screening which has 1K-entry
table and predicts all memory and output-producing instructions; 14.5%, 6.8% and
6.2%, respectively for execution with fault screening which has 1K-entry table and
only predicts memory instructions; 7.9%, 5.0% and 5.1%, respectively for execution
with flush-on-L2-miss technique. In addition, for all the faults on physical register
























































































































Figure 5.21: Average MTTF over 9 benchmarks in fetch buffer, issue queue and
physical register file by applying value prediction, fault screening, or flush-on-L2-
miss techniques.
the latest instructions that have updated the corrupted registers have committed,
the portion of faults that cannot be recovered by the fault detection techniques is
now 21.6%, 18.9%, 20.9%, 20.5%, 21.6% and 20.3% for original execution, execution
with value prediction, fault screening with infinite or 1K-entry table and predict-
ing both memory and all other result-producing instructions, fault screening with
1K-entry table and only predicting memory instructions, and execution with flush-
on-L2-miss technique, respectively. In all, our value prediction technique removes
the largest percentage of the injected faults, and hence results in the fewest faults
that propagate outside the pipeline.
With the faults’ breakdown shown in Figure 5.20, we report the current
MTTF–the percentage of faults that impact program execution but cannot be suc-
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cessfully detected and removed from pipeline by fault detection techniques–in Fig-
ure 5.21. In Figure 5.21, results on each hardware structure are reported separately.
For each hardware structure, there are six groups of bars, representing six differ-
ent program execution including original program run, and program execution with
either value prediction, fault screening or flush-on-L2-miss technique as we have
mentioned. For each type of program execution, there are two bars representing
average MTTF results across all the benchmarks of MTTF–MTTF results are nor-
malized to the original execution. Figure 5.21 shows that value prediction performs
the best in improving program reliability: for fetch buffer, IQ and physical register
file, value prediction improves their MTTF by about 6.23, 1.92 and 1.96, respec-
tively compared to the original execution; fault screening with infinite and predicting
both memory and all other result-producing instructions improves by about 1.48,
1.11 and 1.28, respectively; fault screening with 1K-entry table and predicting both
memory and all other result-producing instructions improves by about 1.37, 1.11 and
1.18, respectively; fault screening with 1K-entry table and only predicting memory
instructions improves by about 1.31, 1.10 and 1.13, respectively; flush-on-L2-miss
technique improves by 2.03, 1.46 and 1.37, respectively.
5.3.4 Fault Detection Analysis
Although bit-invariance screener may make prediction on more instructions
than value predictor, the latter performs better in our fault injection experiments.
This is due to various reasons. For example, instructions computing with immedi-
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ate values usually have more variance bits in their outputs–in other words, those
instructions have bigger value space to be predicted by bit-invariance screener, which
makes it harder for the screener to detect faults. Moreover, for fetch buffer and is-
sue queue, their immediate fields constitute big portions of each entry, thus appear
more vulnerable to faults. Compared to bit-invariance screener, value predictor per-
forms more sensitively: any difference between prediction and computation results
is considered as symptom of potential fault.
Another big source of fault detection by value prediction comes from the fact
that value predictor has lower prediction rate than bit-invariance predictor–faults
can be removed from pipeline by flushes caused by natural mispredictions. Although
such mispredictions also degrade program performance, the performance loss can be
justified by the reliability benefit because our technique selectively targets on long-
latency instructions.
Compared to flush-on-L2-miss technique, value prediction performs better be-
cause it covers more long-latency instructions than load misses. Prediction or flush-





This work is related to the following categories of research.
6.1 Soft Computation
Several researchers have studied soft computations. Breuer [39, 40] recog-
nized multimedia workloads can tolerate errors, and proposed exploiting this error
resilience to address manufacturing defects. Our definition of application-level cor-
rectness is similar to Breuer’s notion of “error tolerance” (ET) [39], which allows
chips that produce numerically incorrect results to be usable as long as their results
are acceptable to the users. The main difference is that Breuer exploited ET to
tolerate hardware defects for higher chip yield, whereas we identify application-level
correctness as one level of redundancy inherent to applications, and exploit it to
tolerate transient faults assuming all the hardware is functionally correct. Another
difference is that we further quantify the notion of “degree of acceptability” with
appropriate fidelity metrics and fault injection experiments to directly measure user
satisfaction.
Other soft computing research includes [41] by Liu et al in which they observed
certain image processing and tracking algorithms can be inexact. They exploited
this fact to improve task schedulability in real-time systems. Palem [42, 43] studied
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probabilistic algorithms to build randomized circuits that are extremely energy ef-
ficient. Finally, Alvarez and Valero [44, 45] found that multimedia applications are
resilient to precision loss. They developed novel value reuse techniques for floating
point operations so that energy consumption is reduced greatly. In addition, Wang
et al. [19] identified some outcome-tolerant branches–called “Y branches”. They
presented the performance speedup by removing mispredictions on those branches.
Compared to all the previous studies, we exploit soft computations for enhancing
program reliability.
6.2 Fault Susceptibility Characterization
In characterizing soft error susceptibility, there are a great number of prior
studies to which our work is related. Among them, the most related are researches
which used detailed CPU models and measured the effects of soft errors by injecting
faults into their models. For example, Saggese et al [46] injected faults into a
DLX-like embedded processor; Wang et al. [47] injected faults into a CPU similar
to the Alpha 21264 or AMD Athlon; Kim and Somani [48] injected faults into
Sun’s picoJava-II; and Czeck and Siewiorek [49] injected faults into an IBM RT PC
processor. All of these fault susceptibility studies used gate- or RTL-level models,
and injected faults into the entire CPU. In contrast, our study uses a detailed
architecture model, and focuses fault injections on important hardware structures
such as physical register file, fetch queue, and issue queue.
Another main difference between our work and all previous studies on soft
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error susceptibility is the definition of correctness used to evaluate the effects of soft
errors. Previous work requires architectural state to be numerically exact for pro-
gram execution to be correct; in contrast, our work only requires program outputs to
be acceptable to the user. By evaluating correctness at a higher level of abstraction,
we measure the additional portion of soft errors that can lead to acceptable pro-
gram outputs. In addition, such notion of application-level correctness depends on
the characteristics of different applications, and thus needs specific fidelity metrics
for evaluation. It is also user-dependent for determining the amount of acceptable
errors in answer quality. All these distinguish our study from previous approaches.
6.3 Analysis of Fault-Tolerance Sources
Another related area to our work is in analyzing sources of fault-tolerance.
Previous research has noticed that not all faults result in visible effects. Shiv-
akumar et al [50] studied masking at the circuit level. They developed an elec-
trical and latching-window masking model, and predicted the impact of these cir-
cuit effects on soft error rates. Kim et al [51] studied logical masking. They pro-
pose “Susceptibility Tables” for logic gates that model the probability a soft error
will propagate through a combinational logic block. Mukherjee et al [18] identi-
fied microarchitecture-level masking (mispeculated instructions, predictor structure
bits, and microarchitecturally idle bits) as well as architecture-level masking (NOP
instructions, performance-enhancing instructions, dynamically dead code, and logi-
cally masked instructions). Wang et al [19] observed that certain conditional branch
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outcomes can be wrong without affecting program correctness (“Y branches”), which
is another form of architecture-level masking.
Our work differs mainly in that we take algorithm-level resilience into consid-
eration, such as the existence of multiple valid outputs and user-level interpretation.
We also explore algorithmic properties, such as redundancy, adaptivity, and reduced
precision, which greatly enhance program’s capability to tolerate errors. Such re-
silience exploration is helpful for both architecture- and compiler- design.
6.4 Fault-Tolerance Techniques
Traditional techniques like Error Correcting Code (ECC) and parity bits have
been widely adopted to protect various hardware structures, especially memory
units. However, these techniques are too costly and thus impractical to implement
on all logic units. Currently, researchers focus on developing new fault-tolerance
techniques to achieve effective fault detection/recovery, or improve system fault
susceptibility.
6.4.1 Fault Detection
To detect or recover from faults, designers typically introduce or utilize explicit
redundant execution in hardware. Faults are detected by comparing results from two
copies of program execution. For example, Horst et al [3] used one separate proces-
sor, while Austin [52] used an additional in-order processor, to recompute and verify
the computation results of the main out-of-order processor. To exploit the exist-
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ing architecture redundancy, Rotenberg [53] suggested simultaneous multithreading
(SMT) platform, while Sundaramoorthy and Purser [54] used chip multi-processor
(CMP) to execute the additional copy of program. Ray et al [6] proposed another
mechanism which relies on register renaming hardware to temporarily split instruc-
tion stream into multiple threads, and then verify their results.
To avoid expensive hardware cost, compiler-based approaches duplicate in-
structions on the software side, such as EDDI proposed by Oh et al [9] and SWIFT
by Reis et al [10]. To reduce the performance cost, Reinhardt and Mukherjee [5] pro-
posed an improved SMT-based approach which only checks instructions whose side-
effects exit the processor core. Reis et al [23] proposed to combine both hardware
and compiler based approaches for better tradeoff between reliability and hardware
cost.
Despite different implementation details, for both hardware and software ap-
proaches, extra redundancy is explicitly created–or existing redundancy is exerted
in addition to original program execution, which usually involves expensive perfor-
mance or hardware cost. In our work, we exploit program’s inherent redundancy
such as value predictability for redundant execution. By exploiting such inherent
redundancy, our technique achieves remarkable reliability improvement with much
small performance degradation.
Regarding to exploiting program inherent redundancy, one of the most related
work to ours is [12]. As described in Section 5.3.1, Racunas et al made use of
value perturbation to detect possible faults. Their technique tries to identify valid
value space of an instruction, which is done by keeping track of past results of that
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instruction. Future output that is not within the recorded value (pattern) space
is considered as potentially corrupted. Compared to their technique, we exploit
value predictability to enhance program reliability. The main difference between
value perturbation and value prediction is that value prediction tries to predict
an instruction’s result exactly. Output that is not equal to the predicted value is
considered as potentially corrupted. Although detecting value perturbation seems
easier, value prediction can be more precise in finding discrepancy. For example, an
instruction’s past value space can be so big that corrupted values by faults may still
fall in valid value space, and thus can’t be detected by value perturbation technique.
Our experiments in Section 5.3.3 compare the reliability impacts of both techniques,
and the results show the effectiveness of our technique.
6.4.2 Fault Recovery
Fault recovery is usually implemented as a complement to fault detection since
to recover from faults, they have to be detected first. Thus, although the perfor-
mance impact of fault recovery techniques is not crucial considering the fact that
they are incurred very infrequently, researchers still work hard to develop efficient
mechanisms. For example, Active-stream/Redundant-stream Simultaneous Multi-
threading (AR-SMT) proposed by Rotenberg [53], can achieve recovery since the
committed state of the redundant stream can be used as a checkpoint. Vijaykumar
et al [32] extended their SRT(Simultaneously and Redundantly Threaded) technique
for fault detection with recovery scheme. Their modifications included buffering in-
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structions from committing until the instructions’ outputs have been verified, plus
methods to avoid stalling instructions at commit while waiting for verification. Sim-
ilarly, Gomma et al [55] proposed hardware-assisted fault recovery for CMPs on the
basis of their Chip-level Redundantly Threaded (CRT) technique for transient-fault
detection. Compared to their techniques, our checkpoint recovery mechanism is ad-
vantageous as we only save part of program state thus performance cost incurred is
very small.
Our recovery mechanism also relates to the vast research area on checkpointing.
Checkpointing is widely used in systems such as parallel & distributed computing.
For example, Chandy and Lamport [56] proposed a global snapshot algorithm for
distributed systems, which is widely adopted and extended to minimize the over-
heads of coordination and context saving by a large number of studies, such as the
work by Kim and Park [57]. Ahmed et al [58] proposed to checkpoint process con-
text and global state based on visible cache line modifications for shared-memory
systems. Compared to their approaches, we focus on only checkpointing necessary
state for application-level correctness in uniprocessor systems. Thus our checkpoint
is very cheap but still effective–our lightweight recovery technique can allow a large
number of faults to be successfully recovered while our soft-checkpointing technique
can recover most of them.
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6.4.3 Reducing Fault Susceptibility
Besides designing more efficient techniques to detect and recover from faults,
researchers have also realized that reducing, but not eliminating, soft-error rate to
achieve less performance degradation is more desirable in some cases. For example,
many systems, such as commodity computers, do not need full or perfect coverage.
Based on this observation, Weaver et al [37] proposed techniques to reduce error
rate by either squashing instructions when long delays are encountered, or delaying
to signal faults until the corresponding instructions are determined not to be dy-
namically dead code. Gomma and Vijaykumar [59] adopted similar approach but on
an SMT platform, which only triggers redundant thread for fault detection during
low-ILP and L2 cache misses. They also proposed to detect faults during high-ILP
by instruction reuse.
Although their techniques are effective in reducing system vulnerability to
faults to some extent, the way they determine when to enable fault protection is
only by monitoring program performance. On the contrary, our checkpointing mech-
anism discounts computations that are inherently resilient to errors, while our fault
detection technique exploits value predictability for redundant execution and takes
value misprediction as symptom of potential faults, thus have much less overhead
on both hardware and performance.
In addition, our technique considers fault vulnerability at the instruction level,
which is absent from most existing techniques. By quantifying instruction’s vulner-
ability, we selectively protect instructions that are most susceptible to faults, thus
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reduce mispredictions and the related recovery cost, while still maintaining accept-
able reliability budget.
6.5 Symptom of Potential Faults
Wang et al [11] proposed the concept of fault symptom–hint at the presence
of soft errors. They exploited symptoms–such as branch misprediction and cache
misses–to trigger fault recovery mechanism. Similarly, Racunas et al made use of
value perturbation to prevent possible faults. Perturbation from the recorded value
space of an instruction is viewed as caused by soft errors, thus triggers correspond-
ing recovery mechanism. Similar to their work, we consider value misprediction as
implication of potential faults, and take recovery action–such as flushing pipeline
in our experiments–to try to remove and recover from faults. The main difference
between their work and ours is that we view value predictability as inherent redun-
dancy for comparing computational results. We also characterize fault vulnerability
at the instruction level, and propose selective prediction to reduce mispredictions




In this chapter, we first summarize the whole dissertation (Section 7.1), then
we enumerate our contributions to fault tolerance research (Section 7.2), and lastly,
we propose possible directions for future study (Section 7.3).
7.1 Summary and Conclusion
This work exploits program’s inherent redundancy for enhancing fault toler-
ance. First, we investigate additional fault resilience at the application level. We
explore definitions of program correctness that view correctness from the applica-
tion’s standpoint rather than the architecture’s standpoint. Traditionally, correct
program’s execution requires architectural state to be numerically perfect. However,
in many cases, even if program execution is not 100% numerically correct, it may
be completely acceptable if the answers can satisfy the user’s requirement. Hence,
faults which have caused such numerically faulty execution are no longer intolerable–
programs appear to be more tolerant at the user(i.e., application) level. We conduct
fault injection experiments and measure the additional fault tolerance at the appli-
cation level compared to the traditional architecture level. Our results show for soft
computations, about 45.8% of fault injections that lead to architecturally incorrect
execution are correct under application-level correctness. We also exploit the re-
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laxed requirements of application-level correctness to reduce checkpoint cost: our
lightweight recovery mechanism checkpoints a minimal set of program state, but
can successfully recovers a major part of program crashes in soft computations; our
soft-checkpointing technique identify computations that are resilient to errors and
excludes their outputs from checkpoint, thus can successfully recovers almost all of
program crashes in soft computations.
We also investigate another form of redundancy inherent in program–value pre-
dictability. We take value prediction as additional program execution and compare
with actual computation results–misprediction is considered as symptom of poten-
tial faults. To reduce misprediction rate caused by limitations of predictor itself, we
characterize fault vulnerability at the instruction level and only apply value predic-
tion to instructions that are highly susceptible to faults. We also vary threshold of
confidence estimator according to instruction’s vulnerability–instructions with high
vulnerability are assigned with low confidence threshold, while instructions with low
vulnerability are assigned with high confidence threshold. Our results show large
reliability gain with very small performance degradation of our selective prediction
mechanism.
7.2 Contributions
This dissertation makes the following contributions within the context of ex-
ploiting program’s inherent redundancy to enhance fault tolerance.
I. Traditional fault tolerance studies adopt strict correctness definitions and re-
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quire perfect numerical integrity of program execution. Such strict require-
ments ignore the flexibility to numerical values from user’s point of view, thus
cause overdesign of systems. Our work explores the numerical redundancy at
the application level–i.e., the existence of multiple numerical outputs which
can all be accepted by users. Such redundancy provides additional fault tol-
erance: faults that cause program to produce numerically different but ac-
ceptable outputs are also tolerable to users. We implement fault injection
experiments on a detailed architectural processor model, and measure the ad-
ditional fault tolerance at the application level, compared to the traditional
architectural level.
II. In our study of application-level fault tolerance, we mainly examine soft com-
putations including multimedia and AI. These areas have been rapidly devel-
oping and widely applied to our modern society. Our analysis shows there are
various sources of redundancy originated in the applications’ own characteris-
tics. Such algorithmic exploration helps understand the behavior of programs
in face of faults, and exposes more chances for cost-effective system design.
III. We implement new fault recovery techniques by exploiting the additional re-
dundancy at the application level. One technique we propose is lightweight
fault recovery which only checkpoints a minimal set of program state–program
counter, architectural register file, and stack. Another technique first identifies
computations that are resilient to errors, and then excludes state that store
their outputs from checkpointing. Such checkpointing mechanisms try to only
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save necessary state for fault recovery, and mainly rely on programs them-
selves to absorb fault corruption and still generate acceptable outputs. Thus
the cost is much smaller than the traditional full checkpointing mechanisms,
while our results show they are effective in fault recovery.
IV. In additional to studying application-level correctness, we study value pre-
dictability as another source of redundancy for fault tolerance enhancement.
We apply value prediction to check computational results and detect poten-
tial faults–we take value misprediction as symptom of fault occurring, and use
re-execution to try to remove faults from pipeline. By exploiting the inher-
ent redundancy in program–value predictability, we avoid expensive hardware
or performance cost by introducing redundant execution explicitly, which is
widely adopted by current fault tolerance research.
V. In order to reduce performance cost caused by additional fault recovery, we
characterize instruction’s vulnerability by computing the percentage of a hard-
ware structure’s average AVF that an instruction relates to. We find that a
small portion of instructions accounts for a major fraction of program vulner-
ability. Thus, by selectively protecting such a small portion of instructions
from fault corruption, the overall reliability can be greatly improved greatly
with relatively much less performance cost than full protection of all instruc-
tions. We also exploit such variation in instruction vulnerability to confidence
estimation of value prediction, and propose adaptive confidence threshold to
better trade off reliability gain and performance cost.
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7.3 Future Directions
In this dissertation, we show it is effective to reduce fault rate by exploiting
program’s inherent redundancy. We implement fault injection experiment and mea-
sure the additional fault tolerance provided by the relaxed correctness definition at
the application level. We also investigate the potential of utilizing value predictabil-
ity to check computational results and detect possible faults. We believe the ideas
presented in this work can be further studied.
I. In this dissertation, we study application-level correctness as well as the ad-
ditional fault tolerance it provides. We also implement cost-effective check-
pointing mechanisms in exploiting such numerical redundancy–i.e., multiple
numerical outputs can appear to be acceptable from user’s standpoint. There
exist more opportunities in this direction. For example, for fault detection, it
is not necessary to monitor the parts of program execution that are resilient to
errors since fault corruption on those parts can be absorbed by program itself
and acceptable outputs, although numerically different from fault-free execu-
tion, can still be produced. This can be achieved through either hardware (e.g.,
utilizing additional hardware thread or processor) or software (e.g., inserting
additional check code during compiler stage) approaches. Such mechanisms
can be more efficient and have less impact on program performance, compared
to protecting the whole program.
However, more practical ways of identifying fault-resilient computations or
program state have to be studied more carefully. In our soft-checkpoint exper-
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iment, we establish the set of soft state manually–first mark computations that
are resilient to errors, then track the state that store the corresponding output
values. This has to be transformed to more automatic methods. For example,
with some assistance from programmers, compilers may convert program code
and incorporate such knowledge about state softness.
In addition, the information on application-level fault tolerance can also be
applied to other fields such as compiler optimization. One key observation is
that the longer one instruction stays in the pipeline, the more vulnerable it
becomes [37]. On the other hand, our analysis shows that instructions which
process soft data, e.g., approximate data, are tolerant to faults. Therefore,
during program compilation, the compiler can transform code in a way that
instructions unrelated to soft data are optimized to stay the least amount of
time in the processor, while the remaining instructions can be scheduled less
efficiently. Moreover, because soft and non-soft data are often interleaved in
the memory, program can be scheduled so that instructions requesting memory
access for soft data are executed first and incur cache misses shortly, while the
following instructions for non-soft data will suffer little cache-miss penalty
since the shared memory blocks have been brought into cache. Thus, the
portion of execution time spent on fault-resilient computations is increased,
and program’s overall reliability is enhanced.
II. In our study, we characterize instruction’s vulnerability and find the major-
ity of program’s overall reliability relies on a small portion of executed in-
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structions. We exploit such observation in our experiments to reduce value
misprediction rate as well as the accompanying recovery cost. Such idea of
selective protection can be extended to other studies in which reliability and
performance cost can be traded by shifting more efforts to instructions that
are more susceptible to faults. For example, a redundant thread that is cre-
ated for checking computational results only needs to re-execute when program
proceeds slowly since that is the time instructions in pipeline are exposed to
faults for longer time and thus become more susceptible.
III. As we have discussed, flushing pipeline can possibly remove faults from prop-
agating to memory and becoming non-recoverable. Accompanied with the
reliability benefit is performance degradation by re-fetching and re-executing
instructions. However, if problems that cause program to run slowly–such as
cache misses or shortage of computation resources–have been resolved dur-
ing re-execution, program can then proceed faster than its original run, and
appear to be less vulnerable than without flushing. Thus it is possible perfor-
mance loss by flushing is made up with reliability gain, which can be perceived
by metrics that incorporating both reliability and performance such as MITF.
Therefore, it is interesting to explore more deeply the relations between flush-
ing and MITF benefit–i.e., identifying the set of instructions which can bring
the most MITF benefit if flushed.
Such study is also interleaved with our work on exploiting value predictability.
Predicting an instruction can benefit reliability without any performance loss,
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but has to pay other price such as power or more hardware for better prediction
accuracy. On the other hand, flushing an instruction may or may not benefit
the compromise between reliability and performance (i.e., MITF). Thus it will
be very useful to incorporate instruction’s predictability, together with the
impact on MITF by flushing, into the policy of selective protection.
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